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The Week

PRESIDENT WILSON'S letter to his fellow-Democrats on Jackson Day has for the time being added a grave additional snarl to the partisan controversy over the Treaty already snarled beyond belief. As in so many previous cases he is trying to gain his point by "digging in" and by refusing to budge in spite of the fact that by so doing he allows his enemies to close in around him and loses contact with his friends. His obstinacy leaves him almost completely isolated. He is being deserted by powerful newspapers which hitherto have fought sturdily on his side. He seems certain to fail in the end; and he deserves to fail. Yet there is something to be said on his behalf. If the Senate ratifies the Treaty subject to the proposed reservations, he will not have accomplished any of the constructive political objects which he sought to accomplish when he proposed the entrance of this country into the war. He realizes, as some of his critics do not realize, how thoroughly the reservations take the United States out of the League of Nations and relieve the American government from its responsibilities and its associations. But equal American participation in the League is all that he has to show as a justification for his concessions in Paris. He sacrificed the Treaty to the League, and now the Senate tries to deprive the League of negotiable value. It is a matter of moral self-respect on his part to cleave to his belief in the supreme value of the Covenant and the necessity of unreserved American adhesion. His moral sincerity makes it impossible for him to act on the irresponsible nationalism and the cynical opportunism to which his own failure in Paris has condemned international political behavior.

HIS REFUSAL to accept any but reservations which do not reserve imposes on the Democratic Senators an impossible alternative. If they stand by him they prevent the ratification of the Treaty and throw the fight into the campaign which is, from their point of view, the consummation most to be avoided. If they do not stand by him and if they agree with the Republicans to ratify subject to substantially the existing reservations, they divide their party on the eve of the Presidential campaign. It now looks as if they would finally adopt the second of these courses. To follow the President's lead and to work for the submission of ratification to popular vote would involve an appeal to the people on an issue in which they take little interest and on which the people both share their lack of interest and tend to disagree with their party position. In fact the only way to give reality to the referendum would be to renominate President Wilson as their candidate for President. It would become his personal campaign. If he did not manage and lead the campaign of the Democrats they could not count even on being defeated with credit. In our opinion public as well as Democratic party interests demand the refusal of a referendum. A Presidential election fought on a clean-cut issue between participation and non-participation in a genuine society of nations might be desirable quite apart from its out-

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come because of its value in educating public opinion. But the association of the existing League with the vicious provisions of the Treaty would falsify the issue in the form in which the President proposes to submit it. The public is weary of the futile controversy. It feels the unreality of the issue and wishes merely to dismiss it with the least possible loss.

ON SATURDAY, January 10th, the Allies exchanged ratifications with Germany and the Treaty became a part of the public law of Europe. The delay in ratifying is usually attributed to the obstructive tactics of the American Senate, but it is doubtful whether in any event the European governments would have been ready much sooner. It now appears that immediate American adhesion to the Treaty is not as essential to the recovery of Europe as its advocates have asserted it to be. The President is willing to have ratification postponed until next November when the results of the election will be known; and Mr. Hoover has outlined a plan for the immediate economic relief of Europe, which does not depend upon American participation in the League. Indeed Mr. Hoover's plan implies differences of political purpose between the United States and Europe which should not be ignored in any future extension of credits. However that may be, Europe is legally in a state of peace and the United States still legally at war with Germany. But the difference is not so wide as it seems. The United States will not remain for long legally at war with Germany and the legal state of peace in Europe is only one more episode in a prolongation of the old contest. One of the first acts of the victors will be to demand the surrender of the German soldiers who are accused of committing crimes against their enemies, and this demand will recreate a state of war in Europe in every respect except the clash of armies.

IT WAS a sinister and significant fact that on the day on which ratifications were exchanged the newspapers carried rumors of the downfall of the ratifying German government. The rumors proved false but all observers are agreed on the weakness not merely of the ministry but of the republic. There appears to be small hope of its survival unless the other European and American governments are willing to strengthen its prestige and help it in meeting its immense difficulties. But there is really only one way of helping Germany through her difficulties and of consolidating the existing middle-class republic—which is to transform the Treaty from an instrument of punishment and vengeance on Central Europe (as it was intended to be) into an instrument of economic cooperation. The Carthaginian peace will destroy Germany or the European Allies will destroy the Carthaginian peace.

IT WOULD be optimistic to assert that as a consequence of their dinner on Jackson Day the Democrats had improved their chances of electing the next President of the United States. Quite apart from the consternation produced by Mr. Wilson's letter, the rest of the proceedings did more to throw light on the quandary of the Democrats than it did upon any very promising method of dealing with it. The question is whether the Democrats shall try to outbid the Republicans as the spokesmen of pugnacious, abstract, law-and-order Americanism, or whether they stick to the popular traditions of the party and try to interpret, even at the cost of losing the next election, the needs and aspirations of the poorer and less articulate part of the American people. Mr. Bryan saw the alternatives clearly. He saw the trend of Republicanism away from Roosevelt progressivism and back towards the class capitalistic point of view of the McKinley epoch. He saw that unless the Democracy organized the opposition to the existing tendency of Republicanism, the situation "would compel the formation of a farmers' party and a labor party." But his attempt to liberalize and popularize the attitude of the Democrats was not successful. The other party leaders remained aloof and Mr. Bryan's own progressive program was pathetic in its inadequacy. It remains doubtful whether he will succeed in forcing the Democratic leaders to abandon the Palmer policy of converting the party into an assistant Republican faction or to become a source of vigorous opposition to the prevailing tendency of Republicanism.

SUPERFICIALLY at least no change has recently taken place in the prospects and the tactics of the several candidates for the Republican nomination. General Wood and Governor Lowden are leading the field and are leaving their numerous rivals well in the rear. But the contest has only begun, and it is not necessarily an advantage to forge ahead early in a race over such rough ground and against so many competitors. It is wholly improbable that any candidate will enter the convention with a majority of the delegates or anything like it; and the final result will be decided not by a popular mandate but by political trading. The several candidates are not running on definite or specific personal platforms. Senator Johnson excepted, they all recommend themselves to the suffrages of their fellow-countrymen by repeating substantially the same speech—a speech in which they declare their deathless and dauntless devotion to America but in which they cannot define Americanism as anything but enmity to an insignifi-

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cant group of violent revolutionists. General Wood's slogan is "law and order, the rights of property, the courts and the constituted authorities." But no mealy-mouthed politician could be more careful than is the plain-spoken soldier to avoid explaining what he, as the chief of the constituted authority of the nation, would do in order to adjust the rights of property to the interests of the public. Yet this is the candidate on whom the mantle of Roosevelt progressivism is supposed to have descended.

THE STEEL STRIKE has ended in a complete victory for the Steel Corporation. The strikers are obliged to return to their jobs, if they can get them back, without having obtained a single concession from their employers. This disastrous outcome was inevitable, considering the huge cash surplus of the Steel Corporation, unless public pressure could be brought to bear upon its officials to confer with the representatives of the unions; but public opinion was divided, and the failure is complete. Union leaders are partly to blame for their own defeat. If they needed, as they did, public sympathy and support, they should have avoided a strike until they had at least made an intelligent attempt to secure it. They were defeated not only by the huge profits which the Steel Corporation accumulated during the war but by its very able and wholly unscrupulous use of a friendly newspaper press. In spite of the existing defeat, it is as certain as anything can be that within ten years the employees of the Steel Corporation will obtain practically all the demands for which they recently struck. Some of them, such as the eight-hour day, will soon be granted voluntarily by the Steel Corporation—probably during the Presidential campaign. As for the unionization of the industry, that will proceed just as quickly as its employees can be Americanized. They have tasted unionism, and they will not forget the taste.

IT IS a melancholy fact that during the fumbling treatment by the two branches of Congress of the problem of railroad reconstruction, the administration has not placed its influence behind a more vigorous and thorough-going policy than any which Congress was prepared to adopt. Yet its own railroad chief was capable of outlining such a policy. Director Walker D. Hines in a recent address before the Bar Association predicted that a few years' experience of railroad operation under either the Senate bill or the House bill would render government operation necessary. It was a grave mistake, Mr. Hines said, to assume that capital alone could assume responsibility for railroad management. The result of acting on this assumption has been that "the public has injected itself into the management through its own organizations and labor has injected itself through its own organizations. . . . The only sort of management which can be permanently effective is one which provides for an orderly participation at the outset of all three of these interests." Mr. Hines also advocates compulsory consolidation on the ground that independent operation of the several railroad systems would necessitate a higher level of rates to guarantee the solvency of the weaker companies than would be necessary in the case of consolidation. But the present Congress has an appetite for thorough-going measures; and the new national railroad policy is being formulated by a few men in secret conference without any assistance from public opinion or from the administration.

IN SPITE of the abortive ending of the conference between labor and the farmers called by the A. F. of L. leaders during December, the attempt to unite large bodies of agricultural and industrial labor upon a common platform will not be abandoned. There is to be a meeting in Chicago from February 12th to 15th to form an All-American Farmer-Labor Cooperative Association. The chiefs of the Railroad Brotherhoods are calling this meeting, the object of which will be rather economic than political. The Brotherhoods realize how ridiculous it is to expect any diminution of the cost of living as the result of the policy of the government; and they realize also that they cannot obtain any benefit from increases in wages which are immediately followed by further increases in prices. They are turning, consequently, to the salutary idea of cooperation and particularly to a general plan of cooperation which associates the farmer with the industrial worker in a joint attempt to obtain the necessaries of life at a lower cost. This is a most promising direction in which to work. Americans need the cooperative movement because it can operate as a part of the existing economic system without sharing in the abuses and weaknesses of capitalism. The coming conference may start something which will help to relieve social unrest by the only sound method of dealing with its causes.

MR. WILL HAYS, speaking for the Republican party, asks what can be done to put an end to industrial unrest; and Mr. Matthew Woll, replying for the American Federation of Labor, proposes the same program that his organization has advocated since the days of free silver. It is a program which includes many of the guarantees labor is entitled to seek, such as the right of col-

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lective bargaining and the establishment of the eight-hour day. But it is a program that does not attempt, as the Plumb Plan attempts, to fix the relationship of the workers toward the public in such a way as to deal with the central questions of productivity and cost to the consumer. Mr. Woll's cure for high prices is to prosecute the profiteer. The new Labor Party, made up largely of A. F. of L. unionists, is less ready to believe in the effectiveness of merely negative legislation.

A YEAR ago it was a mark of pro-Germanism to have wanted such a peace as would not ruin Germany commercially. But a year may be a long time. There are no charges of pro-Germanism brought against the Foreign Trade Council because it has declared that "from the point of view of both self-interest and humanity" this country ought without delay to furnish foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany—and indeed extend such credits as are required to start again the normal processes of industry. It is an irony of our situation that the danger of inviting revolution into Germany is generally appreciated only after a treaty has been written which achieves that result—and a treaty which can be changed only by a unanimous consent that includes the consent of France.

FAMINE is threatening Austria unless the Allies come to the rescue. There is almost no milk. Eight out of every ten children are suffering from rickets. The French press is sympathetic. It warns against delay. But it points out that France herself needs food and fuel, and that only America can give the Austrians what they need. This is true, so far as raw materials are concerned. The American government, the Red Cross and different private agencies must act quickly if we are not to fail in a responsibility obviously ours.

Hoover as President

A GROUP of people were recently discussing whether every Presidential election since 1860 had been the most important election since 1860. We do not propose to add 1920 to the list. If a man were to prophesy about 1920 he would say that unless there is a surprising clarification of the issues in the next few months we shall elect a President in 1920 on slogans and attitudes that will seem peculiarly irrelevant in 1922 and 1923 and after.

For good or evil the fact is that we are not now asked to choose between policies. There may be differences of opinion among the candidates, but they are not well defined differences. They are not defined because we are in a turmoil of confusion in which the sober examination of policy is ignored. At this moment the reasonable citizens' standard of judgment must be the probable behavior of candidates as it can be inferred from their background and training and temperament. They must guess as to how candidates are likely to act. In order to do that they must make a picture, not of the specific issues that are likely to arise, but of the kinds of problems that will confront the next administration.

In such an estimate citizens would undoubtedly put first the restoration of normal business throughout the world. Under that topic would be included the complete liquidation of the war in Europe and Asia, the resumption of world trade, the restarting of the cycles of import and export. Before asking the possible candidates what they think about these things citizens should ask them what they know about them. They would ask such men as General Wood, Governor Lowden, Senator Harding, Attorney-General Palmer, Mr. McAdoo, to show what they have done and said to indicate that they are equipped to discuss these things. They would not be satisfied with bold proclamations of the candidates' loyalty because they would take loyalty for granted. They would know that such boasting is no sign of competence. For anybody can announce his Americanism, but not anybody is fitted to be President of the United States, and so they would be no more moved by a public man's insistence upon his patriotism to make him President than they would by a private soldier's salute to the flag to make him Chief of Staff.

They would inquire about his experience of the relations between American economic life and the world's economic life. Then they would ask about his equipment for dealing with economic facts at home, his knowledge of the national resources, the processes of production, and their relation to men as producers and as consumers. They would seek a man who had proved competence both in stimulating production and in regulating the machinery of distribution and consumption. They would assume that in the next four years the government would require a leader who is trained to think about prices and wages, about real goods, about efficiency, about the things which touch intimately the subsistence and the prosperity of ordinary people; who, because he was trained to think about them, was unlikely to confess his ignorance of them by creating a hullabaloo every time a difficulty arose, to call the police, wave the flag, and do nothing more.

Having satisfied themselves which of the can-

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didates was most likely to think constructively when confronted with the economic facts that are the cause of social problems, they would next examine the candidates as administrators. Then they would know that sound views, noble views, inspiring views do not prevail in government except when they direct the action of a man who can choose other men, can lead other men, can plan programs and execute them. They would seek the man who combined the largest technical knowledge of modern economics with the most clearly demonstrated ability to act successfully and humanely on that knowledge.

To ask those questions is to answer them. There is one man, not an active candidate, who in comparison with all the other candidates, qualifies so readily that his election would be a foregone conclusion under reasonable conditions. That man is Herbert Hoover. Test any other candidate by the standard of personal fitness, experience and training for the issues that will confront the next President and see if you can make a case for him as against Mr. Hoover. Is Mr. Hoover less loyal to American institutions than General Wood or Mr. Palmer? There is nothing to debate. For the rest, will any supporter of Leonard Wood or Mitchell Palmer pretend that either of their candidates knows a fragment of what Herbert Hoover knows about the necessities of the modern world? Would either of them, or any of the others, risk comparison with Hoover, either on knowledge of social conditions, knowledge of American industry, knowledge of world trade, knowledge of European politics, knowledge of diplomacy? Is there one of them who can show a record as administrator which will stand against the record of the organizer of the Belgian Relief, Food Administrator of the Allies, and the Director-General of European Relief? What have any of them said, done, thought, or proposed that fits in anything like the same degree the immediate needs of the country?

After all, there is no other test that can be made. Mr. Hoover shares his limitations with other men. He is sometimes hard to work with, occasionally dogmatic, impulsively prejudiced, and likely to take too short a view. But the springs of his character are generous, and his power of visualizing sympathetically the plight of ordinary people over wide areas and under all kinds of circumstances amounts to genius. He is no dark horse, no straw man manufactured by political boomers, but admittedly the most competent and successful American revealed by the war. He was in it from the day the war started, and every trial enhanced his stature.

That he is the candidate of the constructively minded people of America is indicated by evidence from all parts of the country. And yet it is a peculiar kind of candidacy. He himself has discouraged it, and the people who believe in Hoover and want him have hardly dared to believe that a man so obviously designated for the office could be brought to power by the present political machines. His following is in both parties and in all groups from sane conservative to liberal. The people who are for Hoover are people with their eyes on the facts, not on labels and doctrines. They do not care at this juncture whether the next President in his ultimate philosophy is collectivist or laissez-faire. They do care that the next President shall be a man who can choose men, conduct great affairs, and act on a trained estimate of the facts. They believe Hoover to be that man, and they see no one else who is.

A few weeks ago we should have supposed the hope of Hoover to be vain. There are signs that it is not vain, that if the demand is loud enough and insistent enough the next President can be the man best fitted to be President.

Financial Aid to Europe

AMONG those who do not place their hopes for progress in revolution, there can not be two opinions as to the general desirability of getting the countries of Europe on their feet, financially and industrially, at the earliest possible moment. The war, as could have been foretold at the time when operations settled down to attrition, attrition of men, of material, of financial power, came dangerously near to subverting the economic structure of Europe, laboriously put together through hundreds of years of effort. It did entirely destroy that structure in Russia, where it was weakest, and left it badly shaken everywhere else. Perhaps it can be patched up and made to hang together indefinitely, unless the fathomless folly of a world war is repeated. But we can not certainly know that the economic order of a decade ago can be restored in its essentials until we again see the chief nations of Europe at work, with the mines operating on full time and the fields in tilth, with the factories and workshops busy, unemployment reduced to a minimum, exports balancing imports and the receipts of the public treasuries equal to the outgo. None of these conditions is at present fulfilled. Everywhere there is a deficient production, unemployment and underemployment, everywhere imports exceed exports by tremendous figures, with disastrous results to exchange; in every country that was engaged in the war the public receipts fall startingly short of meeting the public expenditures.

So far all persons who think about Europe at all

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are agreed. Most persons are also agreed that the matter concerns America as well. European disorder can not be a matter of indifference to us, for the Atlantic is not broad enough to keep it from affecting us. To be sure, we were calm enough when the evidence was coming in of the economic decay of Russia in the last year of the Tsar. But we have not been too calm under the natural consequence of that breakdown, the rise of a communistic republic. At present we are disposed to exaggerate rather than to underestimate the dangers to our own institutions of the movements abroad generated by economic disorder. Certainly it must be assumed that we have enough common sense to desire to remove the causes, if we can, when the consequences appear to us an annoyance or a danger. If it is practicable for us to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Europe, we shall not hold ourselves aloof on the ground that it is none of our business.

Whether it is practicable or not—that is where opinions divide. Beginning with Mr. Vanderlip, a succession of American and foreign financiers have insisted upon the desirability of generous loans, making possible the purchase in America of food, materials and machinery for which Europe has not the present means of payment. Estimates of the amount of credit required have varied, but they have run into the billions, as a rule. And even so they have not contemplated thorough rehabilitation. European industry needs materials and machinery, it needs floating capital to tide it over the period of high cost operation while it is reeducating a working personnel whose industrial habits have been disintegrated by war service or by the hardships of civil life in war time. It needs also a sound currency. With marks and francs and even sterling fluctuating incessantly in purchasing power and gold value, all business becomes speculation. One does not know, when he produces on contract, how much the money he is to receive will be worth. Sound currency implies sound finance. It implies the abandonment of fiat money as a means of meeting the public expenditures. Our American financial authorities have not undertaken an estimate of the amount of money that would be required to place European currencies on a sound basis, but nobody would put it at less than several billions. Sir George Paish has calculated at three billions sterling the amount necessary to restore the credit of the European governments. The cost of reconstruction of devastated areas and of supplying working credits, he estimates, would increase this financial requirement to seven billions sterling. That is the amount of money that the collectivity of nations would have to command if they were to set out at once and confidently to do business on the old footing.

The estimate is probably not exaggerated. Europe needs colossal sums. Where opinions differ is in the matter of feasibility of raising such sums by an international loan and applying them in such a way as to do good rather than harm. Nobody supposes that by financial aid alone Europe can be saved. The European nations have to help themselves before they can be helped. They are not now helping themselves to the best of their ability. Shall they therefore be left to find themselves as best they may, with only such limited and inevitable aid as American supply of food to starving cities and the postponement of the demand for payment of interest on sums loaned by America during the war? That is the advice of Mr. Hoover. Or shall the promise of financial relief be held before them, conditional upon their setting their own house in order? That is the advice of Mr. Paish. Advocates of the policy of restricted aid may hurl the epithet of propagandist at those who support the other policy. The latter may retort that their critics are provincial and selfishly nationalistic. There is no profit in such acerbity. Two policies are before us for serious consideration. They are both honestly intended. Both aim at the restoration of a healthy international economic life, and both involve risks. They deserve consideration on their merits.

Let us consider some of the obstacles to European recovery for which the European nations themselves are responsible. Italy is spending far more on her army and navy than comports with her financial power and economic resources. France still shirks the obligation of raising her taxation revenues to the point where the income of her treasury may balance its outgo. England squandered a half a billion dollars on Denikin and Kolchak; she has stopped financing the Russian counterrevolution, but if her financial problems were greatly eased, she could perhaps not be trusted to avoid plunging further into wasteful imperialism. Austria, as Mr. Hoover points out, will remain an international pauper until she is permitted to associate herself with Germany, but France vetoes this arrangement. Neither France nor England will have a normal economic life until Germany is again buying and selling, but neither country is willing to let Germany produce, and without restored production Germany can neither buy nor sell. Russia has a great store of the raw material of the linen industry. For want of that material the French white goods industry languishes, but the French politicians insist on the continuance of the Russian blockade. Rumania has surplus gasolene that would

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help solve the motor transport problem in Jugoslavia and Hungary, but Rumania would rather the populations of those states perished for lack of means of distributing food. Croatia could help out Italy in the matter of wood and coal; but help the Italians? Never! Now what is the world going to do with such a nest of animosities and imbecilities? Leave it to stew out its own salvation? We do not wonder that Mr. Hoover, whose work has been cramped at every turn by the indisposition of European governments to help themselves and to work together for mutual benefit, should be inclined to this course. He has had great provocation, and provocation is sometimes the beginning of wisdom.

It is not always, however. Perhaps when Rumania has gone naked long enough and Austria hungry, the two states will arrange for the mutual exchange of surplus products. Or perhaps the two populations will readjust themselves to want and worklessness and the politics that correspond to those states. Perhaps if an international loan fund were available Rumania would devote all her efforts to getting her share of it, instead of to readjusting her relations with her neighbors. But perhaps also she would listen to the comment of an international financial committee as she did not listen to the orders of the Supreme Council at Paris. Finance is power. In the next decade international financial power may be a more potent instrument than international armies and navies. Those who would make a reality of the League of Nations can afford to canvass this possibility.

But is it proposed that the United States shall itself wield this international financial power, and take the risks and costs for herself? Not at all. What Sir George Paish proposed was an international loan, to be subscribed by private investors everywhere. We should doubtless take more than our proportionate share, as we have more than our proportionate share of the world's purchasing power. We should as a nation be responsible only for our stipulated share of the principal and interest, and then only as guarantors. Assuming that the sums raised by the loan were allocated after due examination of the solvency of the beneficiary nations, there would be no loss, immediate or prospective, to be met by Americans as taxpayers. This is no question of gratuities. It is a question of investing the world's credit to restore the world's production. Is the risk too great? The risk is material only if the present structure of European economic society collapses. Shall we wait to see whether it will collapse, or shall we undertake to prevent the collapse? That, not charity or sentiment, is the real question at issue.

Speaker Sweet Does His Bit

IT WILL be comforting to those who prefer to tremble for the republic rather than to think for it to see that Chicago does not lag behind New York. On Wednesday, the seventh, Speaker Sweet did his bit. On Friday, the ninth, his example had reached Chicago and was approved so highly in certain quarters that it was instantly imitated. Witness the following dispatch to the New York Evening Sun: "Chicago, Jan. 9.—One hundred 'Reds' arraigned here to-day are suffering from black eyes, cut lips and other scars of battle inflicted upon them by the 'respectable prisoners' of the county jail yesterday. Those of the outraged respectability include half a dozen safe crackers, a quintet of auto bandits and a number of jewel thieves. John Russo, charged with robbery, is said to have been the ringleader of the attack on the radicals." It is claimed, we understand, that Mr. Russo secured a good deal of evidence against the Reds during his recent activities on behalf of law and order. When interviewed at his official residence Mr. Russo stated that he agreed entirely with the ringing words of Mr. Arthur Guy Empey as expressed in the January issue of "Uncle Sam"; "What we want to see is patriotism reducing Bolshevik life limit. The necessary instruments may be obtained at your hardware store."

Those who find themselves unable to agree either with Speaker Sweet, Mr. Russo, or Mr. Empey may nevertheless regard the episode at Albany as hopeful. It has brought the current hysteria to a crisis so obvious that the doctors have been called in. Those who shrugged their shoulders and regarded it as a kind of nervous twitch due to war weariness now begin to see that unless it is checked we shall go mad. People who had sat still without protest while bureaucrats declared that daily newspapers were not newspapers, who had said nothing while petty officials banished aliens without a trial, who countenanced a fifteen years sentence against a young girl agitator, who had no comment to make when foreigners studying English were arrested and beaten, who saw no ground for protest in the abolition of assemblage in western Pennsylvania, who cared not how much individual injustice was done by wholesale arrests, who have not chosen to protest against the infamous Davey bill to destroy free speech, most of them are now at least aware of where this whole business of reckless, indiscriminate and violent intolerance leads. It leads to Speaker Sweet and to Mr. Russo. Even the Tribune crawls, and the Times is silent.

Why did it require an attack on representative government to produce a protest from a man like

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Mr. Hughes? Freedom of opinion, except where it is a *direct* incitement to a crime, is a more sacred part of the American constitutional system than the ballot or representation in the legislature. In fact, freedom of opinion is the basis of representative government. For representation is only the means by which opinion affects government. Opinion itself is the source of authority. To suppress opinion is to nullify popular government.

The reason why the suppression of opinion has been accepted by men like Mr. Hughes is that they themselves are the victims of a drugged public opinion. They have acquiesced, to the detriment of their reputation before posterity, because they have not seen clearly just what has been happening in America these last few years. The United States has been engaged in a great war. For the safety of her armies a censorship was instituted. This propaganda was conducted in part by the government itself, in part by the Allied governments, in part by the editors of newspapers and the heads of the great news services acting as patriotic volunteers.

With the signing of the armistice that whole system of censorship and propaganda ceased to have any military justification. But it had been found useful. It had also become a habit, and so it persists. For what purpose? For no purpose that can be called American. The American news system was pooled with the European news system during the war more thoroughly than the American army was ever pooled with the European armies. Its reporters abroad were not trained to make independent reports about Europe. Bewildered men most of them, generally ignorant of foreign languages and completely innocent of European affairs, they were taken in hand by the diplomats and propagandists of Europe. They transmitted what was furnished to them. Perhaps they had to. For it must be remembered that while the European censorships do not legally apply to American correspondents, the power of European officials to obstruct, to exert pressure, to flatter the reporter with a tendency to independence and to stifle his initiative, was sufficient.

These officials acting in closest cooperation with the diplomats had certain very special purposes to accomplish. The chief one was in respect to Russia. They had to secure against the judgment of President Wilson and the American Commissioners acquiescence in the blockade of Russia and the support of the monarchist generals. The object was something far more complicated and European than anti-Bolshevism. In eastern Europe the object was to erect a series of satellite states under French influence in order to create a new balance of power in the continent. In the Balkan states its object was to extend British sea power as a base for future commercial penetration. In Siberia it was a complicated intrigue for one of the rich spots of the world. All these infinitely entangled schemes and ambitions, representing conflicts amongst the Allies, and conflicts between factions within the governments of the Allies were reinforced, of course, by a genuine fear on the part of the conservative classes of Europe that the success of Soviet Russia would by its example, more than by its propaganda, threaten their own position.

Logically there is no doubt that they should have declared war against Russia. But they were too weak to do it. In the early days at Paris they had some hopes that Pershing's army could be used for such a war. But they could not call it a war, first, because the peoples of Europe would have mutinied, and second, because that would have been to admit that there was in fact a government in Russia. Therefore the myth was evolved that Russia was a chaos; at the same time it was asserted, since myths have no logic, that this chaos conducted the greatest organization of spies and propagandists in history. The myth was then exported to America daily in the hope that America would help the blockade, permit any bungling of Central European peace, stand for such things as the Rumanian brigandage, finance the interventions, and in general take almost anything because if it was not taken "bolshevism" would spread.

In America this upas tree has flourished wildly. It has been tended lovingly by every dark force in American life, encouraged and provoked incessantly. Most decent Americans are under the spell of this stupendous fiction. Many of the editors who perpetuated it are under the spell. The publicity methods employed have had such mass, such impact and such repetition that there has been no more chance for reason to assert itself than there would be during an earthquake. This has been the opportunity as well as the incitement for official action, for social pressure, for personal intolerance, which viewed in the light of history, will make this seem one of the most un-American periods in this country's experience.

But there is a limit. It would be optimistic to say that it has been reached. Yet Speaker Sweet has at least brought us in sight of the point which marks furthest north for lawlessness masquerading as law. There is a great body of American opinion which really believes in America and in free government. Until the last few days one might have doubted its existence. It is slowly aroused. It is slowly quieted. It may possibly endure a good deal more trifling with its most precious tradition. Speaker Sweet has

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merely sunk the Lusitania, and another period of watchful waiting may ensue. For our own Major-General Ludendorff is not yet in power, and unlimited warfare against all freedom of speech has not yet been openly declared. It is merely being discussed in Congress under the name of the Davey bill. The overt act in the shape of an assault on some highly organized body of moderate American citizens has still to be made. If it is made, God help the reputation of public men who tampered with American freedom.

Europe on the Rack

"An inefficient, unemployed, disorganized Europe faces us, torn by internal strife and international hate, fighting, starving, pillaging and lying. What warrant is there for a picture of less sombre colors?"

THE foregoing words from the chapter of Mr. Maynard Keynes's book on the Economic Consequences of the Peace which the New Republic printed in its last issue will appear to the majority of American readers as the product of a morbid imagination. Americans instinctively evade or resist any picture of human suffering or failure which can not exist without some radical and stubborn source of physical and moral disorder There are no people in the world who sympathize more quickly or respond more generously to an appeal for help which is provoked by some terrific accident, such as a flood or earthquake; but there they stop. Destiny has treated them so well, they are so prosperous, good humored and complacent that a claim upon their pity and assistance which originates in something more fundamental and sinister than an accidental catastrophe fails to touch their imagination. They are engaged in "selling" this world to one another as the best of all possible worlds. They consider a man who paints pictures of it in sombre colors or asks them to adopt costly precautions against grave impending calamities as suspiciously radical or as gloomily perverse. If they cannot deport his neurotic ideas, they can at least close their minds to his distorted imaginings.

We are, afraid consequently, that the picture which Mr. Keynes paints in last week's New Republic of the present condition of Europe and in this week's New Republic of the sufficient remedies will not open the eyes of very many Americans to the sinister meaning and ominous consequences of what is now taking place in Europe. Yet the picture drawn by Mr. Keynes is not distorted. It is only too true and its ugly consequences are only too probable. The refusal of American public opinion to accept it as true and to act on its truth may well involve penalties as costly to their own future and as dangerous to civilization as if America had refused to intervene in the war. Just as Americans did their best to treat the war as something which did not concern themselves, so they are now trying to escape a large part of the bill of consequential damages. The prolongation of the fighting, the competitive annihilation of peoples and goods demanded by victory, the disastrous economic subterfuges undertaken by both victors and vanquished for the purpose of avoiding obligations which they could not meet, and the sheer destruction which ensued of the actual moral tissue of society have placed a strain upon the social structure which could only be counteracted by a general and firm conviction in favor of disinterested international cooperation. This conviction does not exist in America in sufficient volume. The fact that in this respect America is only following the example already set by Europe indicates the fundamental nature of the disorder and the enormous difficulty of discovering a sufficient remedy.

The restoration to comparative health of the war-poisoned economic body of the world demanded a common policy of treating all the nations as sufferers from a common drastic disease and as dependent for their recovery on a common drastic remedy. But the statesmen of Europe ignored this condition from the beginning of the armistice by continuing the blockade of Germany and of Russia, and by, consequently, keeping the source of the infection alive. They ignored it again when they fixed the bill for reparation at a sum which Germany could not possibly pay; the threat to collect which barred the recovery of Germany and aroused delusive hopes of salutary indemnities among Germany's creditors. They are still ignoring it by persisting in the Russian blockade and by spending their meagre resources, not on the restoration of domestic production, but on the financing of economic and political aggression against suffering and protesting peoples.

The only possible and sufficient agency of physical and moral recuperation would have been a treaty of peace which recognized the general causes of the common calamity and which, without foregoing the imposition of special penalties on the nations most guilty for the war, would be framed chiefly for the purpose of eradicating its causes and creating the bases in applied principle for a progressive society of nations. The world needed a treaty which would express a supreme desire on the part of the civilized nations to come together and to lend to their suffering peoples and to their imperilled civilization a common support. But its framers, as Mr. Keynes only too conclusively

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proves, sacrificed the future of Europe to its past. They perpetuated the causes of international dissension, fanned the fires of international animosity, and by refusing to consider the needs of the suffering peoples of paramount importance, intensified the tendency of industrial nations to divide into irreconcilable classes. Last May we predicted that it would weave the class conflict into the fabric of European society and public law. Subsequent events have unfortunately tended to confirm the prediction. Mr. Keynes sustains the prophecy. "If we aim," he says, "deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe (which is the object of the financial clauses of the Treaty) vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation."

Is there any way of averting or softening the stroke of this threatened calamity? The last chapter of Mr. Keynes's book, published in this week's issue of the New Republic attempts to answer this question. He cannot adopt the easy remedy which is preached so assiduously in the popular press that the ratification of the Treaty will release the waters of healing and recuperation. On the contrary, what Europe needs is less the ratification of the Treaty than the protection against the disastrous consequences of ratification and against the equally disastrous consequences of the prevailing policy of the statesmen who fabricated its provisions. He dismisses briefly the illusion, so prevalent among some English and American liberals, that the proposed League of Nations is capable of being converted into an agency of the needed revision. The combination of Article X with Article V will in his opinion prevent it from becoming anything but an agency for the preservation of things as they are; and the amendments to the Treaty which he considers essential to the recovery of Europe are so drastic that not even a very insignificant fraction of them would possess a chance of obtaining the unanimous support of the Council of the League. In fact the task of revision implies, as he explicitly states, the substitution for the existing political rulers of Europe (and of this country, too) of other leaders who are willing and able to sacrifice exclusive national interests and traditional national animosities to the needs of social order and recuperation. The only sufficient agency of the changes which are required in the Treaty of Versailles is not the limping League of Nations, provided by the Treaty, but a new international conference, which is morally prepared to become the constituent assembly for a living articulate international society.

We shall not attempt to summarize the amendments which Mr. Keynes considers necessary to the recuperation of Europe. In effect they do not amend the Treaty. They re-write it for the double purpose of bringing it into conformity with the pledges of the armistice and of purging from it the provocations to national animosity and the opportunities of class exploitation. Mr. Keynes does not consider the Treaty as a partial realization of the Wilson war aims which deserve to be accepted as a reasonable payment on account. He considers it as the repudiation of those aims which, as long as it stands, will feed the vitality of most of the traditional causes of national and of class irreconcilability. He asks, consequently, for a revision, which is equivalent to a transfiguration; and he himself would be the first to admit that as long as the existing political leaders of Europe and America continue in power, not even a small part of his remedial program has a chance of adoption. Nevertheless he is in our opinion justified in refusing to connive at a supposed settlement which, in addition to being a breach of faith, will in effect actually disintegrate the social order whose dissensions it was supposed to appease. The chief object of Mr. Keynes's book is to prove that in a society, economically organized as is the society of today, a Carthaginian peace, which seeks the ruin of one great people, will in so far as it succeeds, involve the ruin of the other modern industrial nations. If this contention is true, it is not a truth in which those who believe can afford to compromise, to palliate or to hide under a bushel.

In Mr. Keynes's opinion, however, European recuperation does not depend merely upon the drastic reduction of the German indemnity, and the modification in general of the provisions of the Treaty so as to provide for its implied principles reciprocal application. It equally depends upon the cancellation of the debts which the Allied governments borrowed from one another during the prosecution of the war. This is a startling suggestion which, if carried out, would cost the American nation $10,000,000,000 and which American public opinion will relish about as much as French public opinion would relish the reduction of the German indemnity to the same figure. But Americans would do well to scrutinize dispassionately the reasons which Mr. Keynes urges in support of his proposal. As he sees it, the perpetuation of this debt from Europe to the United States, particularly in view of the impossibility of collecting anything but a very moderate indemnity from Germany, would

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burden Europe with a permanent disadvantage in international transactions and would, consequently, prevent hereafter the normal and healthy expansion of trade and mutual good feeling and confidence among nations. The American people, as a consequence merely of taking advantage of its superior economic resources and of acting on its legal economic interest would occupy a privileged position in the economy of the world against which the European peoples would eventually rebel. Mr. Keynes does not ask the United States to surrender its privileged position unless Europe reforms her own ways. He calls the cancellation of the war debt "an act of generosity for which Europe can fairly ask, provided Europe is making an honorable attempt in other directions, not to continue war, economic or otherwise, but to achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole continent." But if the time ever comes when Europe is ready to put her own house in order, she will find in her debt to America an obstacle which if it is not removed, "will prevent the European peoples from facing the inevitable truth about the poor prospects of an indemnity from the enemy with any but a maddened and exasperated heart."

At present it is as fantastic to ask the American people to cancel the indebtedness as it is to ask the British and the French to forego the supposed advantages of their Carthaginian peace. The outlook for immediate action of the kind suggested by Mr. Keynes is hopeless. Yet that admission should not result in either cynicism or despair. Mr. Keynes, like a good physician, after diagnosing the disease and specifying a remedy which the stomach of the patient is too weak to retain, falls back on the final expedient of rebuilding the moral digestion of the sufferer. Disintegration is coming; but it will take place gradually. "We may," he says, "still have time to reconsider our courses and to view the world with new eyes. For the immediate future events are taking charge, and the near destiny of Europe is no longer in the hands of any man. The events of the coming year will not be shaped by the deliberate acts of statesmen, but by the hidden currents, flowing continually beneath the surface of political history, of which no one can predict the outcome. In one way only can we influence these hidden currents,—by setting in motion those forces of instruction and imagination which change *opinion*. The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate, the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds, must be the means."

There is now, to be sure, no other way. The statesmanship which was impotent to prevent the war is proving no less impotent to rescue society from its demoralizing effects. A society organized into irresponsible sovereign nations, devoted primarily to the pursuit of their exclusive interests and ruled by a class of property-owners, in whom a psychology of possession dominates both thought and conduct, is incapable with its existing moral resources of escaping from the consequences of its own defalcation. Those consequences will run their course until, as Mr. Keynes says, men set free forces of instruction and imagination which will adjust prevailing opinions to the human realities of business and politics. It is by means of its opinions that a civilized society fits its behavior to the requirements of its ideals and its experiences. Just at present its moral clothes are shabby and ugly and too small for its growing body. It is overtaken by calamities which are the natural result of its laws, habits and opinions but whose occurrence violates its better ideals. The leaders of the nations are trying to delude them into the belief that they can escape from the consequences of perfidious, destructive and vindictive conduct, such as the making of the peace, by subsequently dressing the window of civilization with a League of Nations. The history of the next few years will expose the futility of this weak resolution to be good at the very moment when they are pocketing the profits of unprincipled violence. It will write the lesson large and clear; and the near future of the world will depend on the ability of public opinion to digest its meaning. If opinion proves teachable, modern society may recover a constructive relation between its ideals and its experience. Society is distraught at present because its mind is diseased by misinformation, propaganda, self-righteous pugnacity and selfish delusions. Its recovery must wait until opinion is refreshed and clarified by new currents from the sources of truth.

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EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — CHARLES MERZ
FRANCIS HACKETT — WALTER LIPPMANN
ALVIN JOHNSON — PHILIP LITTELL
SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor

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How to Mend the Treaty

This article is the final chapter of The Economic Consequences of the Peace.* The writer was principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference and sat as deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council up to June 7, 1919.

IT is difficult to maintain true perspective in large affairs. I have criticized the work of Paris, and depicted in sombre colors the condition and prospects of Europe. This is one aspect of the position and, I believe, a true one. But in so complex a phenomenon the prognostics do not all point one way; and we may make the error of expecting consequences to follow too swiftly and too inevitably from what perhaps are not *all* the relevant causes. The blackness of the prospect itself leads us to doubt its accuracy; our imagination is dulled rather than stimulated by too woeful a narration, and our minds rebound from what is felt "too bad to be true." But before the reader allows himself to be too much swayed by these natural reflections, and before I lead him, as is my present intention, towards remedies and ameliorations and the discovery of happier tendencies, let him redress the balance of his thought by recalling two contrasts—England and Russia, of which the one may encourage his optimism too much, but the other should remind him that catastrophes can still happen, and that modern society is not immune from the very greatest evils.

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What then is to be done? The following tentative suggestions may appear to the reader inadequate. But the opportunity was missed at Paris during the six months which followed the armistice, and nothing we can do now can repair the mischief wrought at that time. Great privation and great risks to society have become unavoidable. All that is now open to us is to redirect, so far as lies in our power, the fundamental economic tendencies which underlie the events of the hour, so that they promote the reestablishment of prosperity and order, instead of leading us deeper into misfortune.

We must first escape from the atmosphere and the methods of Paris. Those who controlled the Conference may bow before the gusts of popular opinion, but they will never lead us out of our troubles. It is hardly to be supposed that the Council of Four can retrace their steps, even if they wished to do so. The replacement of the existing governments of Europe is, therefore, an almost indispensable preliminary.

I propose then to discuss a program, for those who believe that the Peace of Versailles cannot stand, under the following heads:

I. The revision of the Treaty.
II. The settlement of Inter-Ally indebtedness.
III. An international loan and the reform of currency.
IV. The relations of Central Europe to Russia.

I. The Revision of the Treaty.

Are any constitutional means open to us for altering the Treaty? President Wilson and General Smuts, who believe that to have secured the Covenant of the League of Nations outweighs much evil in the rest of the Treaty, have indicated that we must look to the League for the gradual evolution of a more tolerable life for Europe. "There are territorial settlements," General Smuts wrote in his statement on signing the Peace Treaty, "which will need revision. There are guarantees laid down which we all hope will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be enacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate. . . . I am confident that the League of Nations will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin brought about by this war." Without the League, President Wilson informed the Senate when he presented the Treaty to them early in July, 1919, " . . . long-continued supervision of the task of reparation which Germany was to undertake to complete within the next generation might entirely break down;[1] the reconsideration and revision of administrative arrangements and restrictions which the Treaty prescribed, but which it recognized might not provide lasting advantage or be entirely fair if too long enforced, would be impracticable."

* Soon to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Howe.

[1] President Wilson was mistaken in suggesting that the supervision of reparation payments has been entrusted to the League of Nations. As I have pointed out elsewhere, whereas the League is invoked in regard to most of the continuing economic and territorial provisions of the Treaty, this is not the case as regards reparation, over the problems and modifications of which the Reparation Commission is supreme without appeal of any kind to the League of Nations.

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Can we look forward with fair hopes to securing from the operation of the League those benefits which two of its principal begetters thus encourage us to expect from it? The relevant passage is to be found in Article XIX of the Covenant, which runs as follows:

> "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

But alas! Article V provides that "Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting." Does not this provision reduce the League, so far as concerns an early reconsideration of any of the terms of the Peace Treaty, into a body merely for wasting time? If all the parties to the Treaty are unanimously of opinion that it requires alteration in a particular sense, it does not need a League and a Covenant to put the business through. Even when the Assembly of the League is unanimous it can only "advise" reconsideration by the members specially affected.

But the League will operate, say its supporters, by its influence on the public opinion of the world, and the view of the majority will carry decisive weight in practice, even though constitutionally it is of no effect. Let us pray that this be so. Yet the League in the hands of the trained European diplomatists may become an unequalled instrument for obstruction and delay. The revision of treaties is entrusted, primarily, not to the Council, which meets frequently, but to the Assembly, which will meet more rarely and must become, as any one with an experience of large inter-ally conferences must know, an unwieldy polyglot debating society in which the greatest resolution and the best management may fail altogether to bring issues to a head against an opposition in favor of the status quo. There are indeed two disastrous blots on the Covenant,—Article V, which prescribes unanimity, and the much criticized Article X, by which "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." These two articles together go some way to destroy the conception of the League as an instrument of progress, and to equip it from the outset with an almost fatal bias towards the status quo. It is these articles which have reconciled to the League some of its original opponents, who now hope to make of it another Holy Alliance for the perpetuation of the economic ruin of their enemies and the balance of power in their own interests which they believe themselves to have established by the peace.

But while it would be wrong and foolish to conceal from ourselves in the interests of "idealism" the real difficulties of the position in the special matter of revising treaties, that is no reason for any of us to decry the League, which the wisdom of the world may yet transform into a powerful instrument of peace, and which in Articles XI—XVII [1] has already accomplished a great and beneficent achievement. I agree, therefore, that our first efforts for the revision of the Treaty must be made through the League rather than in any other way, in the hope that the force of general opinion, and, if necessary, the use of financial pressure and financial inducements, may be enough to prevent a recalcitrant minority from exercising their right of veto. We must trust the new governments, whose existence I premise in the principal Allied countries, to show a profounder wisdom and a greater magnanimity than their predecessors.

We have seen that there are numerous particulars in which the Treaty is objectionable. I do not intend to enter here into details, or to attempt a revision of the Treaty clause by clause. I limit myself to three great changes which are necessary for the economic life of Europe, relating to reparation, to coal and iron, and to tariffs.

Reparation.—If the sum demanded for reparation is less than what the Allies are entitled to on a strict interpretation of their engagements, it is unnecessary to particularize the items it represents or to hear arguments about its compilation. I suggest, therefore, the following settlement:

(1) The amount of the payment to be made by Germany in respect of reparation and the costs of the armies of occupation might be fixed at $10,000,000,000.

(2) The surrender of merchant ships and submarine cables under the Treaty, of war material under the armistice, of state property in ceded territory, of claims against such territory in respect of public debt, and of Germany's claims against her former Allies, should be reckoned as worth the lump sum of $2,500,000,000, without any at-

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[1] These articles, which provide safeguards against the outbreak of war between members of the League and also between members and non-members, are the solid achievement of the Covenant. These articles make substantially less probable a war between organized great powers such as that of 1914. This alone should commend the League to all men.

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tempt being made to evaluate them item by item.

(3) The balance of $7,500,000,000 should not carry interest pending its repayment, and should be paid by Germany in thirty annual instalments of $250,000,000, beginning in 1923.

(4) The Reparation Commission should be dissolved, or, if any duties remain for it to perform, it should become an appanage of the League of Nations and should include representatives of Germany and of the neutral states.

(5) Germany would be left to meet the annual instalments in such manner as she might see fit, any complaint against her for nonfulfillment of her obligations being lodged with the League of Nations. That is to say, there would be no further expropriation of German private property abroad, except so far as is required to meet private German obligations out of the proceeds of such property already liquidated or in the hands of public trustees and enemy-property custodians in the Allied countries and in the United States; and, in particular, Article 260 (which provides for the expropriation of German interests in public utility enterprises) would be abrogated.

(6) No attempt should be made to extract reparation payments from Austria.

Coal and Iron.—(1) The Allies' options on coal under Annex V should be abandoned, but Germany's obligation to make good France's loss of coal through the destruction of her mines should remain. That is to say, Germany should undertake "to deliver to France annually for a period not exceeding ten years an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the years in question; such delivery not to exceed twenty million tons in any one year of the first five years, and eight million tons in any one year of the succeeding five years." This obligation should lapse, nevertheless, in the event of the coal districts of Upper Silesia being taken from Germany in the final settlement consequent on the plebiscite.

(2) The arrangement as to the Saar should hold good, except that, on the one hand, Germany should receive no credit for the mines, and, on the other, should receive back both the mines and the territory without payment and unconditionally after ten years. But this should be conditional on France's entering into an agreement for the same period to supply Germany from Lorraine with at least fifty per cent of the iron ore which was carried from Lorraine into Germany proper before the war, in return for an undertaking from Germany to supply Lorraine with an amount of coal equal to the whole amount formerly sent to Lorraine from Germany proper, after allowing for the output of the Saar.

(3) The arrangement as to Upper Silesia should hold good. That is to say, a plebiscite should be held, and in coming to a final decision "regard will be paid (by the principal Allied and Associated Powers) to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality." But the Allies should declare that in their judgment "economic conditions" require the inclusion of the coal districts in Germany unless the wishes of the inhabitants are decidedly to the contrary.

(4) The Coal Commission already established by the Allies should become an appanage of the League of Nations, and should be enlarged to include representatives of Germany and the other states of Central and Eastern Europe, of the Northern Neutrals, and of Switzerland. Its authority should be advisory only, but should extend over the distribution of the coal supplies of Germany, Poland, and the constituent parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and of the exportable surplus of the United Kingdom. All the states represented on the Commission should undertake to furnish it with the fullest information, and to be guided by its advice so far as their sovereignty and their vital interests permit.

Tariffs.—A Free Trade Union should be established under the auspices of the League of Nations of countries undertaking to impose no protectionist tariffs[1] whatever against the produce of other members of the Union. Germany, Poland, the new states which formerly composed the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, and the mandated states should be compelled to adhere to this Union for ten years, after which time adherence would be voluntary. The adherence of other states would be voluntary from the outset. But it is to be hoped that the United Kingdom, at any rate, would become an original member.

By fixing the reparation payments well within

[1] It would be expedient so to define a "protectionist tariff" as to permit (*a*) the total prohibition of certain imports; (*b*) the imposition of sumptuary or revenue customs duties on commodities not produced at home; (*c*) the imposition of customs duties which did not exceed by more than five per cent a countervailing excise on similar commodities produced at home; (*d*) export duties. Further, special exceptions might be permitted by a majority vote of the countries entering the Union. Duties which had existed for five years prior to a country's entering the Union might be allowed to disappear gradually by equal instalments spread over the five years subsequent to joining the Union.

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Germany's capacity to pay, we make possible the renewal of hope and enterprise within her territory, we avoid the perpetual friction and opportunity of improper pressure arising out of Treaty clauses which are impossible of fulfilment, and we render unnecessary the intolerable powers of the Reparation Commission.

By a moderation of the clauses relating directly or indirectly to coal, and by the exchange of iron ore, we permit the continuance of Germany's industrial life, and put limits on the loss of productivity which would be brought about otherwise by the interference of political frontiers with the natural localization of the iron and steel industry.

By the proposed Free Trade Union some part of the loss of organization and economic efficiency may be retrieved, which must otherwise result from the innumerable new political frontiers now created between greedy, jealous, immature, and economically incomplete nationalist states. Economic frontiers were tolerable so long as an immense territory was included in a few great empires; but they will not be tolerable when the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey have been partitioned between some twenty independent authorities. A Free Trade Union, comprising the whole of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, Siberia, Turkey, and (I should hope) the United Kingdom, Egypt, and India, might do as much for the peace and prosperity of the world as the League of Nations itself. Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland might be expected to adhere to it shortly. And it would be greatly to be desired by their friends that France and Italy also should see their way to adhesion.

It would be objected, I suppose, by some critics that such an arrangement might go some way in effect towards realizing the former German dream of Mittel-Europa. If other countries were so foolish as to remain outside the Union and to leave to Germany all its advantages, there might be some truth in this. But an economic system, to which every one had the opportunity of belonging and which gave special privilege to none, is surely absolutely free from the objections of a privileged and avowedly imperialistic scheme of exclusion and discrimination. Our attitude to these criticisms must be determined by our whole moral and emotional reaction to the future of international relations and the peace of the world. If we take the view that for at least a generation to come Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity, that while all our recent Allies are angels of light, all our recent enemies, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and the rest, are children of the devil, that year by year Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled, and that she must be ringed round by enemies; then we shall reject all these proposals of mine, and particularly those which may assist Germany to regain a part of her former material prosperity and find a means of livelihood for the industrial population of her towns. But if this view of nations and of their relation to one another is adopted by the democracies of Western Europe, and is financed by the United States, heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of reaction and the despairing convulsions of revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation. Even though the result disappoint us, must we not base our actions on better expectations, and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one country promotes that of others, that the solidarity of man is not a fiction, and that nations can still afford to treat other nations as fellow-creatures?

Such changes as I have proposed above might do something appreciable to enable the industrial populations of Europe to continue to earn a livelihood. But they would not be enough by themselves. In particular, France would be a loser on paper (on paper only, for she will never secure the actual fulfilment of her present claims), and an escape from her embarrassments must be shown her in some other direction. I proceed, therefore, to proposals, first, for the adjustment of the claims of America and the Allies amongst themselves; and second, for the provision of sufficient credit to enable Europe to re-create her stock of circulating capital.

II. The Settlement of Inter-Ally Indebtedness.

In proposing a modification of the reparation terms, I have considered them so far only in relation to Germany. But fairness requires that so great a reduction in the amount should be accompanied by a readjustment of its apportionment between the Allies themselves. The professions which our statesmen made on every platform during the war, as well as other considerations, surely require that the areas damaged by the enemy's invasion should receive a priority of compensation. While this was one of the ultimate objects for which we said we were fighting, we never included the recovery of separation allowances amongst our war aims. I suggest, therefore, that we should by our acts prove ourselves sincere and trustworthy,

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and that accordingly Great Britain should waive altogether her claims for cash payment, in favor of Belgium, Serbia, and France. The whole of the payments made by Germany would then be subject to the prior charge of repairing the material injury done to those countries and provinces which suffered actual invasion by the enemy; and I believe that the sum of $7,500,000,000 thus available would be adequate to cover entirely the actual costs of restoration. Further, it is only by a complete subordination of her own claims for cash compensation that Great Britain can ask with clean hands for a revision of the Treaty and clear her honor from the breach of faith for which she bears the main responsibility, as a result of the policy to which the general election of 1918 pledged her representatives.

With the reparation problem thus cleared up it would be possible to bring forward with a better grace and more hope of success two other financial proposals, each of which involves an appeal to the generosity of the United States.

The first is for the entire cancellation of Inter-Ally indebtedness (that is to say, indebtedness between the governments of the Allied and Associated countries) incurred for the purposes of the war. This proposal, which has been put forward already in certain quarters, is one which I believe to be absolutely essential to the future prosperity of the world. It would be an act of far-seeing statesmanship for the United Kingdom and the United States, the two powers chiefly concerned, to adopt it. The sums of money which are involved are shown approximately in the following table:[1]

Loans to	By United States.	By United Kingdom.	By France.	Total.
United Kingdom	$4,210,000,000	.....	.....	$4,210,000,000
France	2,750,000,000	$2,540,000,000	.....	5,290,000,000
Italy	1,625,000,000	2,335,000,000	175,000,000	4,135,000,000
Russia	190,000,000	2,840,000,000[2]	800,000,000	3,830,000,000
Belgium	400,000,000	490,000,000[3]	450,000,000	1,340,000,000
Serbia and Jugo-Slavia	100,000,000	100,000,000[3]	100,000,000	300,000,000
Other Allies	175,000,000	395,000,000	250,000,000	820,000,000
Total	$9,450,000,000[4]	$8,700,000,000	$1,775,000,000	$19,925,000,000

Thus the total volume of Inter-Ally indebtedness, assuming that loans from one Ally are not set off against loans to another, is nearly $20,000,000,000. The United States is a lender only. The United Kingdom has lent about twice as much as she has borrowed. France has borrowed about three times as much as she has lent. The other Allies have been borrowers only.

If all the above Inter-Ally indebtedness were mutually forgiven, the net result on paper (i. e. assuming all the loans to be good) would be a surrender by the United States of about $10,000,000,000 and by the United Kingdom of about $4,500,000,000. France would gain about $3,500,000,000 and Italy about $4,000,000,000. But these figures overstate the loss to the United Kingdom and understate the gain to France; for a large part of the loans made by both these countries has been to Russia and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered good. If the loans which the United Kingdom has made to her Allies are reckoned to be worth fifty per cent of their full value (an arbitrary but convenient assumption which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has adopted on more than one occasion as being as good as any other for the purposes of an approximate national balance sheet), the operation would involve her neither in loss nor in gain. But in whatever way the net result is calculated on paper, the relief in anxiety which such a liquidation of the position would carry with it would be very great. It is from the United States, therefore, that the proposal asks generosity.

Speaking with a very intimate knowledge of the relations throughout the war between the British,

[1] The figures in this table are partly estimated, and are probably not completely accurate in detail; but they show the approximate figures with sufficient accuracy for the purposes of the present argument. The British figures are taken from the White Paper of October 23, 1919 (Cmd. 377). In any actual settlement, adjustments would be required in connection with certain loans of gold and also in other respects, and I am concerned in what follows with the broad principle only. The sums advanced by the United Kingdom and France, which are in terms of pounds and francs respectively, have been converted at approximately par rates. The total excludes loans raised by the United Kingdom on the market in the United States, and loans raised by France on the market in the United Kingdom or the United States, or from the Bank of England.

[2] This allows nothing for interest on the debt since the Bolshevik Revolution.

[3] No interest has been charged on the advances made to these countries.

[4] The actual total of loans by the United States up to date is very nearly $10,000,000,000, but I have not got the latest details.

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the American, and the other Allied Treasuries, I believe this to be an act of generosity for which Europe can fairly ask, provided Europe is making an honorable attempt in other directions, not to continue war, economic or otherwise, but to achieve the economic reconstitution of the whole continent. The financial sacrifices of the United States have been, in proportion to her wealth, immensely less than those of the European states. This should hardly have been otherwise. It was a European quarrel, in which the United States government could not have justified itself before its citizens in expending the whole national strength, as did the Europeans. After the United States came into the war her financial assistance was lavish and unstinted, and without this assistance the Allies could never have won the war,[1] quite apart from the decisive influence of the arrival of the American troops. Europe, too, should never forget the extraordinary assistance afforded her during the first six months of 1919 through the agency of Mr. Hoover and the American Commission of Relief. Never was a nobler work of disinterested goodwill carried through with more tenacity and sincerity and skill, and with less thanks either asked or given. The ungrateful governments of Europe owe much more to the statesmanship and insight of Mr. Hoover and his band of American workers than they have yet appreciated or will ever acknowledge. The American Relief Commission, and they only, saw the European position during those months in its true perspective and felt towards it as men should. It was their efforts, their energy, and the American resources placed by the President at their disposal, often acting in the teeth of European obstruction, which not only saved an immense amount of human suffering, but averted a widespread breakdown of the European system.[2]

But in speaking as we do of American financial assistance, we tacitly assume, and America, I believe, assumed it too when she gave the money, that it was not in the nature of an investment. If Europe is going to repay the $10,000,000,000 worth of financial assistance which she has had from the United States with compound interest at five per cent, the matter takes on quite a different complexion. If America's advances are to be regarded in this light, her relative financial sacrifice has been very slight indeed.

Controversies as to relative sacrifice are very barren and very foolish also; for there is no reason in the world why relative sacrifice should necessarily be equal,—so many other very relevant considerations being quite different in the two cases. The two or three facts following are put forward, therefore, not to suggest that they provide any compelling argument for Americans, but only to show that from his own selfish point of view an Englishman is not seeking to avoid due sacrifice on his country's part in making the present suggestion. (1) The sums which the British Treasury borrowed from the American Treasury, after the latter came into the war, were approximately offset by the sums which England lent to her other Allies *during the same period* (i. e. excluding sums lent before the United States came into the war); so that almost the whole of England's indebtedness to the United States was incurred, not on her own account, but to enable her to assist the rest of her Allies, who were for various reasons not in a position to draw their assistance from the United States direct.[3] (2) The United Kingdom has disposed of about $5,000,000,000 worth of her foreign securities, and in addition has incurred foreign debt to the amount of about $6,000,000,000. The United States, so far from selling, has bought back upwards of $5,000,000,000, and has incurred practically no foreign debt. (3) The population of the United Kingdom is about one-half that of the United States, the income about one-third, and the accumulated wealth between one-half and one-third. The financial capacity of the United Kingdom may therefore be put at about two-fifths that of the United States. This figure enables us to make the following comparison: Excluding loans to Allies in each case (as is right on the assumption that

[1] The financial history of the six months from the end of the summer of 1916 up to the entry of the United States into the war in April, 1917, remains to be written. Very few persons, outside the half-dozen officials of the British Treasury who lived in daily contact with the immense anxieties and impossible financial requirements of those days, can fully realize what steadfastness and courage were needed, and how entirely hopeless the task would have become without the assistance of the United States Treasury. The financial problems from April, 1917, onwards were of an entirely different order from those of the preceding months.

[2] Mr. Hoover was the only man who emerged from the ordeal of Paris with an enhanced reputation. This complex personality, with his habitual air of weary Titan (or, as others might put it, of exhausted prize-fighter), his eyes steadily fixed on the true and essential facts of the European situation, imported into the Councils of Paris, when he took part in them, precisely that atmosphere of reality, knowledge, magnanimity, and disinterestedness which, if they had been found in other quarters also, would have given us the Good Peace.

[3] Even after the United States came into the war the bulk of Russian expenditure in the United States, as well as the whole of that government's other foreign expenditure, had to be paid for by the British Treasury.

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these loans are to be repaid), the war expenditure of the United Kingdom has been about three times that of the United States, or in proportion to capacity between seven and eight times.

Having cleared this issue out of the way as briefly as possible, I turn to the broader issues of the future relations between the parties to the late war, by which the present proposal must primarily be judged.

Failing such a settlement as is now proposed, the war will have ended with a network of heavy tribute payable from one Ally to another. The total amount of this tribute is even likely to exceed the amount obtainable from the enemy; and the war will have ended with the intolerable result of the Allies paying indemnities to one another instead of receiving them from the enemy.

For this reason the question of Inter-Allied indebtedness is closely bound up with the intense popular feeling amongst the European Allies on the question of indemnities,—a feeling which is based, not on any reasonable calculation of what Germany can, in fact, pay, but on a well-founded appreciation of the unbearable financial situation in which these countries will find themselves unless she pays. Take Italy as an extreme example. If Italy can reasonably be expected to pay $4,000,000,000, surely Germany can and ought to pay an immeasurably higher figure. Or if it is decided (as it must be) that Austria can pay next to nothing, is it not an intolerable conclusion that Italy should be loaded with a crushing tribute, while Austria escapes? Or, to put it slightly differently, how can Italy be expected to submit to payment of this great sum and see Czecho-Slovakia pay little or nothing? At the other end of the scale there is the United Kingdom. Here the financial position is different, since to ask us to pay $4,000,000,000 is a very different proposition from asking Italy to pay it. But the sentiment is much the same. If we have to be satisfied without full compensation from Germany, how bitter will be the protests against paying it to the United States. We, it will be said, have to be content with a claim against the bankrupt estates of Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, whereas the United States has secured a first mortgage upon us. The case of France is at least as overwhelming. She can barely secure from Germany the full measure of the destruction of her countryside. Yet victorious France must pay her friends and Allies more than four times the indemnity which in the defeat of 1870 she paid Germany. The hand of Bismarck was light compared with that of an ally or of an associate. A settlement of Inter-Ally indebtedness is, therefore, an indispensable preliminary to the peoples of the Allied countries facing, with other than a maddened and exasperated heart, the inevitable truth about the prospects of an indemnity from the enemy.

It might be an exaggeration to say that it is impossible for the European Allies to pay the capital and interest due from them on these debts, but to make them do so would certainly be to impose a crushing burden. They may be expected, therefore, to make constant attempts to evade or escape payment, and these attempts will be a constant source of international friction and ill-will for many years to come. A debtor nation does not love its creditor, and it is fruitless to expect feelings of goodwill from France, Italy, and Russia towards this country or towards America, if their future development is stifled for many years to come by the annual tribute which they must pay us. There will be a great incentive to them to seek their friends in other directions, and any future rupture of peaceable relations will always carry with it the enormous advantage of escaping the payment of external debts. If, on the other hand, these great debts are forgiven, a stimulus will be given to the solidarity and true friendliness of the nations lately associated.

The existence of the great war debts is a menace to financial stability everywhere. There is no European country in which repudiation may not soon become an important political issue. In the case of internal debt, however, there are interested parties on both sides, and the question is one of the internal distribution of wealth. With external debts this is not so, and the creditor nations may soon find their interest inconveniently bound up with the maintenance of a particular type of government or economic organization in the debtor countries. Entangling alliances or entangling leagues are nothing to the entanglements of cash owing.

The final consideration influencing the reader's attitude to this proposal must, however, depend on his view as to the future place in the world's progress of the vast paper entanglements which are our legacy from war finance both at home and abroad. The war has ended with every one owing every one else immense sums of money. Germany owes a large sum to the Allies; the Allies owe a large sum to Great Britain; and Great Britain owes a large sum to the United States. The holders of war loans in every country are owed a large sum by the state; and the state in its turn is owed a large sum by these and other taxpayers. The whole position is in the highest degree artificial, misleading, and vexatious. We shall never to able to move again, unless we can free our limbs from these paper shackles. A general bonfire is

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so great a necessity that unless we can make of it an orderly and good-tempered affair in which no serious injustice is done to any one, it will, when it comes at last, grow into a conflagration that may destroy much else as well. As regards internal debt, I am one of those who believe that a capital levy for the extinction of debt is an absolute prerequisite of sound finance in every one of the European belligerent countries. But the continuance on a huge scale of indebtedness between governments has special dangers of its own.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century no nation owed payments to a foreign nation on any considerable scale, except such tributes as were exacted under the compulsion of actual occupation in force and, at one time, by absentee princes under the sanctions of feudalism. It is true that the need for European capitalism to find an outlet in the New World has led during the past fifty years, though even now on a relatively modest scale, to such countries as Argentine owing an annual sum to such countries as England. But the system is fragile; and it has only survived because its burden on the paying countries has not so far been oppressive, because this burden is represented by real assets and is bound up with the property system generally, and because the sums already lent are not unduly large in relation to those which it is still hoped to borrow. Bankers are used to this system, and believe it to be a necessary part of the permanent order of society. They are disposed to believe, therefore, by analogy with it, that a comparable system between governments, on a far vaster and definitely oppressive scale, represented by no real assets, and less closely associated with the property system, is natural and reasonable and in conformity with human nature.

I doubt this view of the world. Even capitalism at home, which engages many local sympathies, which plays a real part in the daily process of production, and upon the security of which the present organization of society largely depends, is not very safe. But however this may be, will the discontented peoples of Europe be willing for a generation to come so to order their lives that an appreciable part of their daily produce may be available to meet a foreign payment, the reason of which, whether as between Europe and America, or as between Germany and the rest of Europe, does not spring compellingly from their sense of justice or duty?

On the one hand, Europe must depend in the long run on her own daily labor and not on the largesse of America; but, on the other hand, she will not pinch herself in order that the fruit of her daily labor may go elsewhere. In short, I do not believe that any of these tributes will continue to be paid, at the best, for more than a very few years. They do not square with human nature or agree with the spirit of the age.

If there is any force in this mode of thought, expediency and generosity agree together, and the policy which will best promote immediate friendship between nations will not conflict with the permanent interests of the benefactor.[1]

III. An International Loan.

I pass to a second financial proposal. The requirements of Europe are *immediate*. The prospect of being relieved of oppressive interest payments to England and America over the whole life of the next two generations (and of receiving from Germany some assistance year by year to the costs of restoration) would free the future from excessive anxiety. But it would not meet the ills of the immediate present,—the excess of Europe's imports over her exports, the adverse exchange, and the disorder of the currency. It will be very difficult for European production to get started again without a temporary measure of external assistance. I am therefore a supporter of an international loan in some shape or form, such as has been advocated in many quarters in France, Germany, and England, and also in the United States. In whatever way the ultimate responsibility for repayment is distributed, the burden of finding the immediate resources must inevitably fall in major part upon the United States.

The chief objections to all the varieties of this species of project are, I suppose, the following: The United States is disinclined to entangle herself further (after recent experiences) in the affairs of Europe, and, anyhow, has for the time being no more capital to spare for export on a large scale. There is no guarantee that Europe will put financial assistance to proper use, or that she will not squander it and be in just as bad case two or three years hence as she is in now;—M. Klotz will use the money to put off the day of taxation a little longer, Italy and Jugo-Slavia will fight one another on the proceeds. Poland will devote it to fulfilling towards all her neighbors the military role which

[1] It is reported that the United States Treasury has agreed to fund (i. e. to add to the principal sum) the interest owing them on their loans to the Allied governments during the next three years. I presume that the British Treasury is likely to follow suit. If the debts are to be paid ultimately, this piling up of the obligations at compound interest makes the position progressively worse. But the arrangement wisely offered by the United States Treasury provides a due interval for the calm consideration of the whole problem in the light of the after-war position as it will soon disclose itself.

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France has designed for her, the governing classes of Rumania will divide up the booty amongst themselves. In short, America would have postponed her own capital developments and raised her own cost of living in order that Europe might continue for another year or two the practices, the policy, and the men of the past nine months. And as for assistance to Germany, is it reasonable or at all tolerable that the European Allies, having stripped Germany of her last vestige of working capital, in opposition to the arguments and appeals of the American financial representatives at Paris, should then turn to the United States for funds to rehabilitate the victim in sufficient measure to allow the spoliation to recommence in a year or two?

There is no answer to these objections as matters are now. If I had influence at the United States Treasury, I would not lend a penny to a single one of the present governments of Europe. They are not to be trusted with resources which they would devote to the furtherance of policies in repugnance to which, in spite of the President's failure to assert either the might or the ideals of the people of the United States, the Republican and the Democratic parties are probably united. But if, as we must pray they will, the souls of the European peoples turn away this winter from the false idols which have survived the war that created them, and substitute in their hearts for the hatred and the nationalism, which now possess them, thoughts and hopes of the happiness and solidarity of the European family,—then natural piety and filial love should impel the American people to put on one side all the smaller objections of private advantage and to complete the work, that they began in saving Europe from the tyranny of organized force, by saving her from herself. And even if the conversion is not fully accomplished, and some parties only in each of the European countries have espoused a policy of reconciliation, America can still point the way and hold up the hands of the party of peace by having a plan and a condition on which she will give her aid to the work of renewing life. The impulse which, we are told, is now strong in the mind of the United States to be quit of the turmoil, the complication, the violence, the expense, and, above all, the unintelligibility of the European problems, is easily understood. No one can feel more intensely than the writer how natural it is to retort to the folly and impracticability of the European statesmen,—Rot, then, in your own malice, and we will go our way—

> Remote from Europe; from her blasted hopes;
> Her fields of carnage, and polluted air.

But if America recalls for a moment what Europe has meant to her and still means to her, what Europe, the mother of art and of knowledge, in spite of everything, still is and still will be, will she not reject these counsels of indifference and isolation, and interest herself in what may prove decisive issues for the progress and civilization of all mankind?

Assuming then, if only to keep our hopes up, that America will be prepared to contribute to the process of building up the good forces of Europe, and will not, having completed the destruction of an enemy, leave us to our misfortune,—what form should her aid take?

I do not propose to enter on details. But the main outlines of all schemes for an international loan are much the same. The countries in a position to lend assistance, the neutrals, the United Kingdom, and, for the greater portion of the sum required, the United States, must provide foreign purchasing credits for all the belligerent countries of continental Europe, Allied and ex-enemy alike. The aggregate sum required might not be so large as is sometimes supposed. Much might be done, perhaps, with a fund of $1,000,000,000 in the first instance. This sum, even if a precedent of a different kind had been established by the cancellation of Inter-Ally war debt, should be lent and should be borrowed with the unequivocal intention of its being repaid in full. With this object in view, the security for the loan should be the best obtainable, and the arrangements for its ultimate repayment as complete as possible. In particular, it should rank, both for payment of interest and discharge of capital, in front of all reparation claims, all Inter-Ally war debt, all internal war loans, and all other government indebtedness of any other kind. Those borrowing countries who will be entitled to reparation payments should be required to pledge all such receipts to repayment of the new loan. And all the borrowing countries should be required to place their customs duties on a gold basis and to pledge such receipts to its service.

Expenditure out of the loan should be subject to general, but not detailed, supervision by the lending countries.

If, in addition to this loan for the purchase of food and materials, a guarantee fund were established up to an equal amount, namely $1,000,000,000 (of which it would probably prove necessary to find only a part in cash), to which all members of the League of Nations would contribute according to their means, it might be practicable to base upon it a general reorganization of the currency.

In this matter Europe might be equipped with the minimum amount of liquid resources necessary to revive her hopes, to renew her economic organization, and to enable her great intrinsic wealth to

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function for the benefit of her workers. It is useless at the present time to elaborate such schemes in further detail. A great change is necessary in public opinion before these proposals can enter the region of practical politics, and we must await the progress of events as patiently as we can.

[Here are omitted certain sections in which Mr. Keynes favors the raising of the Russian Blockade.]

I see few signs of sudden or dramatic developments anywhere. Riots and revolutions there may be, but not such, at present, as to have fundamental significance. Against political tyranny and injustice revolution is a weapon. But what counsels of hope can revolution offer to sufferers from economic privation, which does not arise out of the injustices of distribution but is general? The only safeguard against revolution in Central Europe is indeed the fact that, even to the minds of men who are desperate, revolution offers no prospect of improvement whatever. There may, therefore, be ahead of us a long, silent process of semi-starvation, and of a gradual, steady lowering of the standards of life and comfort. The bankruptcy and decay of Europe, if we allow it to proceed, will affect every one in the long run, but perhaps not in a way that is striking or immediate.

This has one fortunate side. We may still have time to reconsider our courses and to view the world with new eyes. For the immediate future events are taking charge, and the near destiny of Europe is no longer in the hands of any man. The events of the coming year will not be shaped by the deliberate acts of statesmen, but by the hidden currents, flowing continually beneath the surface of political history, of which no one can predict the outcome. In one way only can we influence these hidden currents,—by setting in motion those forces of instruction and imagination which change *opinion*. The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate, the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds, must be the means.

In this autumn of 1919, in which I write, we are at the dead season of our fortunes. The reaction from the exertions, the fears, and the sufferings of the past five years is at its height. Our power of feeling or caring beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-being is temporarily eclipsed. The greatest events outside our own direct experience and the most dreadful anticipations cannot move us.

> In each human heart terror survives
> The ruin it has gorged: the loftiest fear
> All that they would disdain to think were true:
> Hypocrisy and custom make their minds
> The fanes of many a worship, now outworn.
> They dare not devise good for man's estate,
> And yet they know not that they do not dare.
> The good want power but to weep barren tears.
> The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
> The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;
> And all best things are thus confused to ill.
> Many are strong and rich, and would be just,
> But live among their suffering fellow-men
> As if none felt: they know not what they do.

We have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly. For these reasons the true voice of the new generation has not yet spoken, and silent opinion is not yet formed.

MAYNARD KEYNES.

Can the Strike be Abandoned?

SEVERAL years ago the workers in the lighting plants of Paris determined to remind the people of that city of a few elementary facts. At nine in the evening, I think it was, they suddenly struck work for sixty minutes. For that hour is was hardly necessary to prove to any Parisian that modern society is cooperative. M. Bakst's most exquisite ballet, the professor at the Sorbonne lecturing on non-Euclidean geometry, the politician pleading before his audience, the conference of financiers were all interrupted with the same precision. A few thousand humble individuals had walked away from their machines.

When the lights were turned on again at ten o'clock the editors began to write their opinion of the outrage for the morning newspapers. They argued that no minority, no matter how just its grievances, had a right to interrupt so many higher things, that in accepting employment at an indispensable trade, the electrical workers were under a moral obligation to society at large, that a necessary occupation was a public trust. All the people who had been to the Bakst ballet agreed, and so did most other citizens of the town. But the fact remained that machine industry is so organized that determined minorities can paralyze it and that injunctions, legal or moral, cannot revive it.

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Indeed the more self-conscious men become about their place in the industrial system, the smaller becomes the minority which can paralyze that system. It is vulnerable at strategic points. At those points there are key men, and of those key men some are not easily replaced.

Because there has been a rather startled realization of how vulnerable the industrial system is, many Americans in the last few months have condoned the Garys and Palmers. On the merits they would never have condoned a man who will boast as Mr. Palmer did recently that he won a "victory" but did not reach a settlement. Because they felt that a new and dangerous power of coercion had been indicated, they were willing to fend the threat by disregarding immediate issues, by disregarding the equities, and to make an overwhelming demonstration of force against strategic minorities among workingmen. They saw revealed a power that might some day be violently abused, and they were ready to crush that power or anything that symbolized it regardless of whether it was then actually being abused. In other words they chose to treat as if it were actually here, a danger which at the moment was only potential.

That there is a potential danger seems to me undeniable. For illustration take railroads, coal, steel, millinery, and medical research. Imagine any social order you like in which these five occupations exist. Assume, as you must, the truth of Mr. Gompers's claim that under no conceivable social order can injunctions make unwilling and determined men work. Then picture a four weeks' strike in each of these occupations: On the railroads it is literally a national calamity, seriously comparable to an armed invasion; in the coal mines, it is a very costly inconvenience; in the steel mills it is far less inconvenient; in the millinery shops, it has almost no national significance, and in medical research it may mean merely a much needed vacation for tired men. Lengthen the respective strikes to three months: in railroads it is absolutely intolerable; in coal it is greatly serious; in steel it is costly; in millinery it is still negligible, and likewise in medical research. Now on what theory is anyone to argue that railwaymen should exercise more power than miners, miners more power than steel workers, steel workers more power than milliners or scientists? Yet potentially they do. The President may never hear of a millinery strike, he will ignore a three months' steel strike, he will gamble on a coal strike, but a railway strike he could not palter with twenty-four hours. It is not a question of the justice of the men's claims. It is a question of their strategic position in the industrial system.

In what is usually called the democratization of industry, the power of the strategic minority is likely to increase rather than to diminish, unless new and better methods of social control are devised. For it is not possible to assume, I think, that the direct action of indispensable minorities is merely a phase of transition to some other social order in which all serious conflicts of interest are eliminated. In any system there will remain the fact that some men do work which sustains life from day to day, some do work which sustains it from year to year, while the labor of others is effective only over long periods of time. In a purely industrial republic in which each guild was highly autonomous those who created the immediate necessities would be immeasurably more powerful than those who produced for deferred consumption.

This may seem a bit like borrowing trouble. After all if we have government by minorities today those minorities do not consist of wage earners. It is not a minority of workingmen that is trying to foment war with Mexico, that bungled the peace, that failed to organize coal as a public service, that abolished civil liberty in parts of Pennsylvania and West Virginia. It was a minority of employers that wrecked the Industrial Conference. It was not a minority of workers who refused all negotiations in the steel industry, or exploited a bit of fantastic legalism in the coal industry. And yet, just as it was a mistake for the general public to treat the potential danger of coercion by minorities as actual, so it would be no less a mistake to treat it as negligible.

If the reluctant apologists for Mr. Gary and Mr. Palmer committed the fallacy of confusing what was possible with what had happened, the supporters of trade unionism would commit no less a fallacy if they treated what is distinctly possible as altogether improbable. Now the philosophy of labor as expounded by Mr. Gompers on December 13th is simply the obverse of Mr. Gary's. Both deny to the general public any right of representation. Both tell the state to keep its hands off. Both profess high regard for the public welfare, and both rely on their own inherent industrial power. Mr. Gary looks forward to an indefinite period of suppression. Mr. Gompers looks forward to an equally indefinite period of expansion. They are conflicting doctrines, but they spring from the same view of life. If Garyism won we should have despotism tempered by rebellion; if Gomperism triumphed we should hardly escape an attempt at domination by the strategic minorities.

While ultimately one would be about as bad as the other; while immediately as a kind of Hob-

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son's choice I may think Gomperism is preferable to Garyism, the majority of people will as a matter of fact choose Garyism rather than Gomperism. They will do this because labor's power cannot be asserted without disturbing the routine of life, whereas the obstinate employer's power always seems to be asserted in favor of the tranquillity of the state. The exercise of its power by labor is almost always starkly and crudely visible, but the power of what Mr. Roosevelt described as the invisible government is invisible. So long as labor simply disturbs the routine again and again and again, so long as its only articulate philosophy is that it will continue to disturb it, so long as its victories seem to be nothing but the fluctuations of trench warfare, orderly reconstruction of industry is impossible. In the name of majority rule as against the threat of minorities, the government will attempt suppression. In the name of liberty and democracy and humanity organized labor will blindly grasp powers which sections of labor will exploit.

Say the A. F. of L. leaders at Washington: We stand for liberty, and we mean by liberty that no law and no official shall obstruct us in the use of all the bargaining power that we can develop. Where this leads we do not say, and we do not inquire, though we shall be very patriotic about it. Now it is not conceivable that the salaried classes, the farmers or the merchants will be satisfied with the prospect of an endless cycle of demands, strikes, "settlements," recriminations. They will support the resistance to organized labor unless and until the program of labor has at least the promise of stability and peaceful adjustment within it. The leadership of the A. F. of L. will sooner or later have to grasp that fact. So long as its ideal is "rights," and its tactics militancy tempered by expediency, it will be faced with desperate opposition and that opposition will tend more and more to raise to power in the ranks of labor those who are militant without caring about expediency.

The plain fact is that sooner or later the strike will have to disappear from all those services on which the immediate life of the community depends. No people living in a complex industrial system will tolerate forever the possibility of great suffering because of a deadlocked dispute between the managers and employees in an industry producing immediate necessities. The demand that this threat be ended will become irresistible. The real question is when it will be ended and how. The reactionaries say it will be ended now by forbidding strikes. Mr. Gompers says it will never be ended. The statesmanship of labor would consist in saying that it will be ended on certain conditions. The formulation of those conditions is not an easy task but it is an inevitable one.

What is meant by "conditions"? At present the strike is used to force the acceptance of concrete demands, an eight hour day, a certain scale of pay and so forth. The reactionary plan for forbidding strikes proposes simply to rob the unions of the only force they command, thus making them entirely dependent upon the good will of the employer. This means that law and order are identified with the will of the employer—L'état c'est lui. The result of this would be to make every strike a rebellion, and to make rebellion normal. Is there no alternative? There is, and Mr. Gompers has recognized it in practice though not in theory. He has agreed that policemen should not be allowed to strike. Yet he knows that the Boston policemen were miserably sweated men. On what theory then can he justify taking away from them their right to strike? Because there was an outcry? That is in itself no reason at all. The ultimate justification must lie in the belief that a legal process can be devised which at once safeguards the interests of the individual policeman and protects the community from such a strike. If no such process can be devised by the human mind then we have made the occupation of policemen one which no self-respecting men will enter.

What are the essentials of a legal process which would safeguard the interests of a working man sufficiently to justify the prohibition of strikes? This is immensely difficult ground but it may be worth while to attempt to formulate tentatively certain principles. We are dealing only with highly organized industries supplying goods and services on which the community is immediately dependent.

I. That after a certain fixed period of apprenticeship, no one shall be discharged or demoted except by a process agreed upon in advance for the industry with appeal to an administrative council of the industry in which employers and employees are equally represented. It should be an accepted principle that any one who has qualified as a member of an industry has thereafter a certain property interest in his job which cannot be confiscated except by a known legal process. This is in effect the introduction of the civil service principle into the great public utilities modified to eliminate the deadening effect of a too much vested interest in a job. It carries with it the principles of insurance against unemployment, illness, accident, maternity and old age.

II. That the wage system be revised so as to be based on the following elements: A basic yearly minimum rate fixed by agreement in relation to the cost of living at the last period when prices were

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not disturbed by the abnormal inflations of the war, for convenience the year 1913. The necessary yearly minimum income on that date in defined industrial regions to be the basic index of 100 for the calculation of wages. To this be added each month the differential between the index number at that time and the basic rate. The two together to constitute the minimum wage in that public service.

At fixed intervals the basic rate shall be subject to revision by conference, taking into consideration what the industry can afford to pay. The facts in the case shall be determined by expert investigators and shall be made public.

To that minimum wage another differential to be added for the different classes of labor to allow for differences in skill, responsibility, length of service, etc. This classification should be worked out by independent expert investigators and passed upon by an industrial council with equal representation of employers and employees. It is understood that these are minima, established without prejudice to the principle of special additional reward for services not easily subject to classification or as special incentive in conditions requiring unusual effort or initiative.

III. Periodic collective profit sharing based on the principle that any reduction in the cost of production or any general advance in prosperity shall be shared in some fixed ratio by the employees, the management and the consumer.

IV. Representation of the employees in the management of the corporation with the right of appeal to a public authority in case the management of the industry is inefficient and wasteful. This public authority to have power under established rules to discharge any official or any employee of the corporation found incompetent, corrupt, or useless, and after full investigation to order any reorganization in technique or business management or capitalization which may be required to make the industry in fact a public service.

V. All excess profits over a maximum fixed by Congress, unless they can be shown to be the clear result of socially useful initiative, rather than of external factors, to be taken by taxation or by an enforced reduction of prices.

VI. The right of appeal to an independent public tribunal for an investigation in all extraordinary circumstances, and in grievances where no routine method of securing redress exists.

VII. Complete civil liberty, not only in the state, but within the industry, as intended by the framers of the American Constitution.

On some such conditions as these the workers in vital industries could well afford to make a five or ten year experiment in the abandonment of the strike. The project ought to be regarded distinctly as an experiment and there should be a clear understanding that at the end of the period the whole thing shall be abandoned if it has not worked. This will put society on its good behavior and help the experiment be a success.

Such a proposal coming from labor would create a totally new atmosphere in the industrial world. People not affiliated with union labor would feel radically different about many things if they saw some prospect of real industrial peace ahead of them. And after all what would organized labor be doing by such a proposal? It would be entering into a vast collective bargain with the community, a bargain which safeguards all its essential purposes under a legal sanction. The only new thing in principle is this legal sanction. Labor in the vital industries would make a very satisfactory contract enforceable at law. The difference between it and any other collective contract would be that it ran for a longer period, that it gave labor infinitely greater security against the hazards of industry, and at the same time offered to the community at large security against the thing which it most fears. If the conditions are just in the sense that they provide for justice under changing conditions, if in other words they do not freeze labor in statu quo, if they will give that sense of security without which the human reason cannot operate, then it is to the advantage of all that for an experimental period, the agreement shall have behind it the full authority of law.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

To an Unknown Lady with Sombre Eyes

I looked a moment through a door
That soon was closed, but not before
You raised your long, pale face and looked at me
Unknown, unknowing what your life might be,
And showed such sorrow in your sombre eyes,
That I was made ashamed to see.

Three sorrows come to make hearts sore:
To have a wish, and nothing more;
To lie beside desire, no joy in it;
Or, like some old, exhausted woman, sit
With cold hands held before an empty hearth,
Uncareful of your wish or wit.

I do not know what torment tore
Your heart, and left it hurt and sore—
A wish fulfilled; a wish your life denies;
Or the cold soul in which all impulse dies—
But it was some unfathomed sorrow raised
That deep disquiet in your eyes.

ST. JOHN ERVINE.

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Einstein's Theory of Relativity

I. Time and Space

WITH their columns crowded with news of grave economic and political disturbances at home and abroad, it was a rather liberal conception of what is really important that prompted our daily newspapers to find room for a report of a discussion on the nature of light and gravitation, held at a meeting of a London scientific society. The character of the report, however, but served to emphasize the tragic chasm between science and our popular intelligence of it. Apart from some ludicrous misapprehensions, our popular accounts suffered from confusing three distinct issues: (1) Einstein's original theory of relativity, (2) his later, more general theory, and (3) his theory of gravitation. The establishment of non-Newtonian mechanics and of non-Euclidian geometry are, again, different issues, the latter having been known to mathematicians for about a century.

Of Einstein's work the most revolutionary, and today the most firmly established, is the theory of relativity as formulated in 1905. Eight years ago, at the Brussels conference of the world's leading physicists, it was already referred to as "the older mechanics" in contrast with the more recent quanta theory especially associated with the name of Planck. Like other great innovations, the theory of relativity is based on a simple and even familiar principle, but one that had not been adequately developed before Einstein. Since Galileo and Newton it has been known that no mechanical experiment on a body can tell us whether it is at rest or moving uniformly in a straight line. Whatever metaphysics may say about absolute time and space, the physicist is restricted to measurable magnitudes, and he can tell whether a body is at rest or in uniform motion only by measuring its distance from some other physical body.

If we are in a Pullman car we tell whether our neighbor is walking or at rest, by referring to fixed elements in the car, e. g. the floor and the walls, independent of the fact whether our car is at rest or in uniform motion. We determine the motion of the car only in relation to the earth, the uniform motion of the earth only by reference to the sun, and the motion of the sun only by the variation of its distance from some "fixed" star. But whether our whole stellar or material universe is at rest or moving as a whole in a given direction, is a meaningless question to the experimental physicist. For he cannot discriminate between such rest and motion so long as he accepts the first principle of modern mechanics, viz. that a body not acted upon by external force maintains its state of rest *or* uniform motion, and that there is no mechanical means of telling which of these two alternatives is actually the fact.

All this is perfectly orthodox and has long been more or less familiar. Einstein's radicalism consisted in extending this principle of mechanics to the whole of physics, i. e. extending it to the realm of optics and electricity. In the latter fields, the principle of relativity had been disregarded because the triumph of the electric theory of light established the conception of a single ether filling the whole of space, so that the question whether a body moves with refernce to this ether was practically equivalent to the question whether it moves with reference to absolute space. All experiments, however, invariably failed to show any evidence of the motion of the earth relative to the ether. The most famous and accurate of these experiments, the one originally devised by Professor Michelson in 1881, showed that the earth's motion does not affect the velocity of light, that the latter is the same in all directions precisely as if the earth were at rest rather than moving in a given direction. Many complicated and perversely ingenious explanations were invented to explain the discrepancy between these experiments and the established theory of a fixed ether. The most important and successful of these attempted explanations was the one devised by Lorentz, who suggested that all bodies are shortened in the direction of their motion, depending on the rate of their velocities to that of light. That mere motion should modify the length of a body may be no more surprising than that temperature should do so. But if all bodies are equally shortened, our measures of length, our foot-rules or yardsticks, are also shortened, and our clocks or other time-measuring mechanisms are necessarily affected. This modification of our units of distance and time is the mathematical essence of the relativity theory, and the equations which describe it bear the name of Lorentz. Lorentz's procedure, however, seemed somewhat arbitrary and he did not adequately explain why all substances, including such diverse ones as sandstone and pine wood, should all contract in precisely the same proportion.

It was at this point that there appeared in 1905 the epoch-making paper by Einstein, then a young

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employee in the Bern patent office, but already the author of some remarkable contributions to theoretic physics. With the courageous directness of youth and genius, unburdened by too much academic knowledge of what others had done, Einstein went back to simple first principles. Disregarding completely all the artificial and cumbrous theories of the ether, solid, fluid, elastic, labile, irrotational, gyrostatic, adynamic, etc., he got rid of all the artificial and perplexing difficulties in the explanation of optical and electrical phenomena in moving bodies, by boldly accepting the actual results of physical experimentation. The actual results generalized give us the principle of relativity, viz. that *all* the laws of physical change are the same whether we suppose our system to be at rest or in uniform motion. Thus to revert to our previous illustration, a scientist experimenting in a moving Pullman car will find that the laws of electrical as well as mechanical phenomena are precisely the same as those found by a scientist experimenting in a building fixed to the earth. More particularly the velocity of light will be the same whether our car is at rest or in motion, and similarly if we substitute the whole terrestrial globe for the car. If we accept this principle, then, the negative results of all the attempts to measure the motion of the earth relative to the ether are not anomalies to be explained, but just what we ought to expect.

The reader may at this point suspect that I am unduly simplifying a principle which has widely been hailed as the most radical and paradoxical since the days of Copernicus. But I am really faithfully stating Einstein's principle, though substituting common words for the more elegant, accurate, and comprehensive language of mathematics. The paradoxical character of Einstein's work consists not in the principle of relativity, but in the fact that Einstein works out its consequence logically and in universal terms, whereas our common notions of time and space are based on and bound up with our ordinary experience in which the time it takes the light of different objects to reach us is such an infinitesimal part of a second that it can and must be disregarded for ordinary purposes. But when we come to deal with astronomic facts, the inaccuracy of our common ideas must be corrected.

To say that the identically same event must appear in one place and time to one observer and in another place and time to another observer may be surprising. But logic and rigorous experimentation are here on the side of the surprising. Thus if our Pullman scientist sends out an instantaneous light signal, let us say from the rear end of his moving train, the center of the resulting light disturbance will appear in all his experiments as fixed with reference to his car, whereas to the scientific observer outside of the train the center of the light disturbance will remain in a point of space from which the train is moving away. This dependence of the place of an event upon the observer's physical system shocks us because our imagination functions only between certain limits and breaks down when we try to image the addition or subtraction of the velocity of even a fast train to that of light, an addition which can be accurately stated to be less than 1/10,000,000 but which our imagination cannot really appreciate. Professor Michaelson's experiments, however, clearly indicate that if the velocity of our train were a thousand times as great (i. e. equal to that of the earth in its orbit) the discrepancy mentioned above could clearly be detected with optical instruments of precision.

The most startling paradox, however, of the relativity theory is Einstein's discovery that two events which are simultaneous in one system, say our Pullman car, are not so in another system, e. g. when observed from the earth relative to which the car is moving. This does violence to our preconceived notion of an imaginary time flow that serves as the one absolute and unique time of all events in all possible universes. But the history of science shows that our subjective intuitions are far from infallible. At any rate, just as the question as to whether matter is or is not infinitely divisible is not to be settled by the nature of our subjective intuitions but by physical operations, so likewise must the actual physical time position be determined not by subjective notions but by some system of objective measurement, by clocks, chronometers, etc. Here Einstein's epoch-making work was marvelously lucid. How do we establish in physics the simultaneous character of two events which take place in different portions of space? Clearly it must depend on some system of signaling. If you are in an astronomic observatory in possession of a standard clock and I want my clock to indicate the same time as yours, I telephone to you and when you say "twelve o'clock," I set mine at the same hour; but to be accurate, I must know the time it takes the telephone sound to reach me. Various experiments are possible by which we can determine this time. All such experiments, however, actually involve motion of the observer and dependence on optical or visible signals. As light is the most universal of all forms of signaling and as recent experiments on radium and cathode rays make it extremely unlikely that there can be any physical velocity greater than that of light, Einstein uses the method of light signaling to define the way in which all clocks can be synchronized or made to denote the same time. If you have a mirror which will instantly reflect

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back any light ray which I send you, I will know that so long as the velocity of light and the distance between us remain constant, the time at which you receive my signal is just half way between the time I send and the time I receive it.

Let us now suppose that you and I have thus synchronized our clocks, standing at the ends of a very long moving platform. If now we similarly get in touch with an observer relative to whom our platform is moving, we shall find that two events which are recorded as simultaneous by our two clocks are not recorded as simultaneous by his clock, for, while you and I must regard the time it takes light to travel from you to me as equal to the time it takes the light to make the return journey, the observer relative to whom we are both moving necessarily regards the two periods as unequal, since, as we are moving away from him, he must reckon that the signal he sends after us travels between us not only the length of our platform but also the distance that the platform itself moves during this period, whereas any ray returning to him travels the distance between us diminished by that which the platform itself moves during this period. Similarly, if two observers in the system relative to which we are moving have synchronized their clocks, they will record two events as simultaneous which to you or me are not simultaneous at all, since to you or me these two observers are precisely in the same relative position as if *they* were on a platform moving away from us.

The reader, who has clearly grasped the foregoing analysis of physical simultaneity, will see nothing paradoxical in the fact that distances between fixed points grow shorter and clocks are seen to grow slower as they move away from us.

For how do we determine the length of an object? When we are close up to it and it is at rest we lay off the length of a yardstick on it and count the number of times we do so. But when we deal with a distant or moving object we determine its length by the time it takes a light-ray to pass over it. Now as it takes a longer time for a light ray to pass over an object that is moving in the same direction with it and a shorter time to pass over an object that is moving in the opposite direction, it follows that objects moving toward us with the light will be lengthened and objects moving away from us will be shortened.

That the rate at which a clock marks time will be changed by an increasing distance between it and the observer ought to be even clearer. If when you are going away on a long and continuous journey you write home at regular intervals, you should not be surprised that with the best possible mail service your letters will reach home at progressively longer intervals, since each letter will have a greater distance to travel than its predecessor. If you were armed with instruments to hear the home clock ticking, you would find that as your distance from home keeps on increasing, the intervals between the successive ticks (i. e. its seconds) grow longer, so that if you travelled with the volicity of sound the home clock would seem to slow down to a standstill,—you would never hear the next tick. Precisely the same is true if you substitute light-rays for sound waves. If with the naked eye or with a telescope you watch a clock moving away from you, you will find that its minute hand takes a longer time to cover its five-minute intervals than does the chronometer in your hand, for it takes a longer time for the light from the later positions to reach you, and if the clock travelled with the velocity of light you would forever see the minute hand at precisely the same point. That which is true of the clock is, of course, also true of all time intervals which it measures, so that if you moved away from the earth with the velocity of light everything on it would appear as still as on a painted canvas. On the return journey, however, everything would seem correspondingly speeded up, so that when you reached home you would find the sum of your time account exactly the same as that of the home clock.

The last point may make vivid the fact that we have been dealing with a theory as to the possibility of different accounts of the same course of nature, and that these accounts must balance in the end if they are correct. This aspect of the theory has not been sufficiently emphasized by those scientific radicals who have no regard for the susceptibilities of their more timid and conservative brethren. But despite some hasty words—of which Einstein himself has not been altogether free—the corrections or refinements of the theory of relativity can no more be said to be subversive of established science or of our common sense ideas of time and space, than the pruning work of the gardener can be said to be destructive of his plants. What to the lay reader may at first seem a bewildering profusion of different times and places, time rates and velocities, are readily and simply harmonized by the proper formulae or equations, just as we harmonize different accounts in yards and meters, or in dollars and pounds sterling.

The theory of relativity affords a remarkable instance of substantial progress in physics achieved by what might be viewed as a more accurate and comprehensive method of keeping our account of nature. The triumph of the electron and other theories as to the "ultimate" constitution or structure of matter, has tended to put in the shade the view of men like Mach, who insisted that the phys-

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icist can also gain by more critically examining his fundamental ideas, instruments and methods. Einstein's work, which professes to be inspired by Mach, shows that the latter's method may help us not only to introduce order into our science of electricity and to explain otherwise baffling optical and astronomical facts, but also to predict hitherto unsuspected facts such as the bending of light rays by gravity. But these developments and their more general significance deserve separate treatment.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

The "Force and Violence" Joker

THE INQUISITORS are versatile. They do not rely only, in their Radical-hunt, on the support of Radical-haters. They have created a formidable joker to appeal to the liberals. This is the "force and violence" exception to the rule of free speech.

Should a man be allowed to say anything he wants? Yes, obviously, reply the Inquisitors—even to the point of advocating complete change of industry, the government, or the social structure—*provided, of course, he does not advocate bringing about the change by "force and violence."* That sounds reasonable. It is apparently in tune with liberal thought. We all deprecate violence. We instinctively approve efforts to end violence.

And so we innocently play into the hands of the Lusk Committee, the House Immigration Committee, Mr. A. Mitchell Palmer, and all the rest of the perfectly coordinated and impetuous hunters of "Bolshevism"—defined as any sniff of any doctrine that originated outside the States of America United to the ideal of a free people. Because what the Inquisitors are after is *not* the finding of a person who actually preaches immediate violent acts—he is almost non-existent—but the chance to put up to a magistrate, an immigration official, or an upper-class, special-panel jury, the legal question whether extremist doctrines do not in themselves *imply* "force and violence," and so make their holder jailable or deportable. The answer to which question depends on one fact only, a fact outside the record, namely the conservative or liberal temper of the person who has to answer it. In one of my cases the District Attorney challenged a prospective juror because he had once upon a time had something to do with an association for ameliorating the condition of children of the poor.

This legal effect of the "force and violence" joker escapes the liberal altogether too often. Thus at the Committee of 48 Convention in St. Louis there were numerous persons who came forward, hot on the subject of the denial of free speech, and proposing to remedy it by a declaration that the right shall be inviolate, *provided that a man may not advocate "force and violence."* And one of our most liberal journals qualifies a strong editorial by the exception: "Of course we do not mean that the United States is not justified in returning to their native countries aliens who *announce a deliberate purpose of using violence to change American institutions.*"

So we help the Inquisitors. And they go on winning out—as they have for centuries on similar lines of oblique attack. Free speech in every country has always meant complete liberty to discuss any subject except the one, at the moment, most interesting. The most interesting subject, be it kingship, or religion, or slavery, or peace terms, or social upheaval (according to the century), is always rendered dangerous by some legal theory that sidles up to it and constitutes itself the other Siamese twin. Just as in 1918 one could not discuss peace terms or the unauthorized war in Russia without "obstructing the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States," so one cannot now discuss communism, or soviets, or the "one big union" without advocating "force and violence." The New York Times scare-head of January 4th, "Reds Plotted Country-Wide Strike; Arrests Exceed 5,000," explains unconsciously *why* they were arrested. They advocated the general strike. The legal reason remains "advocacy of force and violence," spelled out of the programs of the Communist and Communist Labor parties, which are not more revolutionary, or more violent, in any essential, than the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx, written in 1848 and circulated in this country in translation since 1872.

It was precisely because the Inquisitors had always won out by such oblique attacks in England, that the American Revolutionists, when they forced their Bill of Rights upon our Constitution, made *no* exception as to "force and violence," or sedition, or any kind of loose talk, but said flatly and even vehemently, "The Congress shall make *no* law abridging the freedom of speech."

But the courts and the authorities go on making exceptions in this, our fundamental law; distrusting the power of truth to maintain itself before the free inquiry of the world; repressing untruth and half truth alike; and flaunting everywhere, in our legislation, our congressional oratory, and our newspapers, the dreaded hoodoo of "force and violence." To what end? To the end that they may incarcerate or deport, with one or two actually criminally minded persons, hundreds or thousands

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of bitter idealists who say that capitalism is forever inconsistent with human freedom, that Republican-Democratic government serves no purpose but the maintenance of the capitalist system, and advocate the industrial strike as a means of political change—just as the Triple Alliance in England is threatening a vast industrial strike if before March the government shall not have undertaken the nationalization of the mines.

That such "Reds" in arguing their program should occasionally use loose and violent language is inevitable. Political talk is likely to be excited talk, as witness the remark of that conservative of conservatives, Senator Fall, in debating the Treaty with Senator Hitchcock: "God deliver us from the necessity of appealing to the ultimate powers of the people of the United States to change forcibly their form of government!"—or the remark of that other arch-conservative, Secretary of State Langtry of Massachusetts, speaking in a Church of God the other day on American "Bolshevists" and "traitors": "If I had my way I would take them out in the yard every morning and shoot them, and the next day would have a trial to see whether they were guilty." Now as a matter of fact Senator Fall would not dream of appealing to force to change the government, nor would Secretary Langtry think of raising a pistol against a real Red who stood before him in shabby clothing in his frontyard. Such talk is simply political violence, excited and overstated, because of extreme conviction and deep feeling. We do not propose to put such people in jail—and quite rightly. Why? Because they are not, as a fact, inciting to violence. They are not urging anybody in particular, or even people in general, to commit the crimes indicated. They are simply blowing off pressure of overheated political ideas, and we rely on the good sense of everybody not to take them too seriously. To jail them for such explosions would be like jailing one's motor tire because it had blown out. It is the nature of tires and men to blow out under unusual circumstances; it is also their nature not to do so most of the time, and not really to intend to do so at any time.

But let an I. W. W. or an alien or a Communist get one-half as excited, and what happens to him? We take him in dead seriousness and run for the handcuffs. And yet, when we have several hundred "Reds" lined up, we get the plaintive truth even from the Times reporter: "They were a tame, unterroristic looking crowd, and their appearance bore out the statements of operatives that not a man had tried to put up a fight."

Let me give a few examples of how the "force and violence" formula works out legally.

In Secretary Lansing's message to foreign capitals on the Russian deportees occurs an excited series of statements: "These persons . . . under the protection of this Government have plotted its overthrow; . . . are a menace to law and order; . . . are arrayed in opposition to government, to decency, to justice. *They plan to apply their destructive theories by violence in derogation of law.*" Do they? All the 247? Or are they merely members of the I. W. W., or the Union of Russian Workers, or believers in Bakunin or Kropotkin or Tom Paine? I am sufficiently familiar with the process of their ejectment to suspect that in 249 of the cases it was not their *method* of effecting change, but the change desired, which made them anathema.

Peter Bianki, for example. The newspapers pictured him as a demon of ruthlessness, flinging back imprecations from the deck of the Buford. What was he in fact? I speak from personal knowledge, since I was prepared to defend him under a Lusk indictment for "criminal anarchy" for reprinting last summer in a little sheet called "Bread and Freedom" one of the classics of Russian anarchism, by Novomirsky, published in Odessa in 1907, of which there were two copies on file in the New York Public Library. Bianki was a young Russian machinist, tall and slender, with much natural distinction and the gentlest possible manners. "How do you like the Bolsheviki?" I asked him. "I do not like them much," he said. "They believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat. I do not believe in the dictatorship of anybody. I want freedom." That was it. That was his crime. He wanted freedom, and he did not think there was any in America. He spent his time saying so. A scholarly and painstaking examination of Bianki in the past by Frederic Howe, then Commissioner at Ellis Island, had shown that he was not a believer in violence, not a dangerous anarchist, and Mr. Howe had quite rightly acted upon these conclusions. It remained for the present Inquisitors to hound him out of the country. But it was of Bianki, and such as him, that Secretary Lansing assumed and stated "destructive theories of violence"—because they believed in a complete change in our basic theories of government.

Another example. Larkin and Gitlow are indicted under the New York "Criminal Anarchy" statute, for "advocating the overthrow of organized government by force and violence." How is it said the crime was committed? By publishing the Manifesto of the Left Wing of the Socialist party. Is there, in that document, any "announcement of a deliberate purpose of using violence to change American institutions?" To a liberal mind, no announcement whatever. To a conservative

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mind, an implied announcement. The manifesto is simply a bringing up to date of the theories of Karl Marx. It contains the usual Socialist revolutionary theories and catch-words. Among others the phrase "political mass action." Larkin and Gitlow have a hearing before Chief Magistrate McAdoo. His reasoning runs thus: Political mass action? That means general strike. General strike means coercion. Coercion means suppression. Suppression means extermination, violence and anarchy. And—verbatim from the Court opinion—"While the money from the banks flows into the coffers of the leaders of the revolutionary communists, the blood of the doomed class will gurgle in the gutters." Q. E. D. And this from the Chief Magistrate of the chief city of the chief democracy in the world. A socialistic manifesto has violence imputed to it and becomes "criminal anarchy," because of its expressed thorough-going purpose to alter the existing government by the pressure of continued industrial strikes.

A final example. Attorney General Palmer, in his New Year's Day message of Peace on Earth Bad Will to Reds, promises "an unflinching, persistent, aggressive warfare against any movement, no matter how cloaked or dissembled, having for its purpose either the promulgation of these ideas or the excitation of sympathy for those who spread them." What ideas? Since when has our American Department of Justice been hired to make war on ideas? One thought their job was to run down criminals. Oh, but that is all right; the Attorney General says so. "The 'Red' movement represents a specific doctrine, namely the introduction of dictatorship the world over *by force and violence.*" So, you see, we are not making war on ideas, only on criminals, who advocate "force and violence." But does anyone suppose that of those persons to be jailed by Mr. Palmer in 1920 in his war on the "Reds" even five per cent will be of the almost unknown type who announce a deliberate purpose of using violence?"—or who would urge anybody to do a definite criminal act? Will they not rather be 100 per cent I. W. W.'s, Communists, and Strike Organizers, recruited from that great body of our population who may be jailed with as much impunity as they are beaten up by the police, because they are mostly voteless, mostly foreigners, and have no stake in the community beyond their lives and their liberties?

It might be thought that the jury system should afford some protection in this class of cases. It does not. A jury is swayed by economic fear and ignorance just as much as a judge. The very ideas of socialism or communism in their barest forms shock an average jury to such an extent that they mistake the shock itself for "force and violence." No laws affecting free speech have ever been applied with more savage rigor by judges than they are by juries. The convictions of the Bloody Jeffrey in the Seventeenth Century were based on jury verdicts.

No, if you give to district attorneys, and other officers, the chance of going to trial on an issue of advocating "force and violence," they are very nearly as well off as if the crime were defined as mere disagreement with existing conditions.

There are only two possible safe rules. One is that proposed long ago by Thomas Jefferson, the forgotten founder of our present radical-hunting party, that it is "a dangerous fallacy . . . to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his power into the field of opinion," and that it is time for the officers of the law to interfere only "when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order."

The Jefferson rule is not law in America, although it has come into practical working use in England. The other safe rule is that laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the Abrams case (Judge Brandeis concurring). Judge Holmes holds that Congress can constitutionally punish speech only when it is of such a nature and delivered under such circumstances as to produce "a clear and imminent danger" that immediate substantive evils will result from it.

I believe that Judge Holmes's rule *is* law in America today. Unfortunately, however, the other seven judges of the Supreme Court disagreed with him, and laid down a rule so vague that under it we can continue to punish very nearly any kind of loose talk that we want to, irrespective of whether it creates any danger whatever of resulting violent acts.

Efforts have been unavailing to get the Sterling bill amended in the Senate by inserting in various places the word "direct," to overcome its indirect and oblique provisions. Various other pending bills are drastic and indirect beyond hope of cure. If some of them should pass before these words appear in print, it may even become seditious to suggest that the best way to handle the "Red" problem would be by having an honest, and orderly, and intelligent government, which would not only let people go on violently talking, but try to do something about the evils which occasion the talk, instead of being content to get out the brass knuckles to enforce subserviency to intolerable conditions. By no other means can we maintain the intent and the wisdom of the sweeping injunction laid down by our Constitution: "The Congress shall make *no* law abridging the freedom of speech."

SWINBURNE HALE.

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Out of the Mouths of Miners

IT WAS a little town in Pennsylvania. It was several little towns in Pennsylvania. In them I talked with miners. They were honest God-fearing workmen, these miners. They worked with their hands.

I was glad and proud to meet them. They had been the objects of several complimentary allusions from the Administration when the Administration was looking to them to rise against the strike which their national convention had ordered and which their national leaders had called. And from other sources, too, at that time, they had been in receipt of extremely gratifying communications comparing them most favorably with their national leaders in mental and moral power. Their national leaders were wild and wicked, but the miners in the mines were sound sensible people, for a clear reason.

This reason found an especially fertile lodgment in the minds and utterances of Cabinet members, United States Senators, clergymen, lawyers and journalists. The miners in the mines were sound sensible people because they did not live by agitations, exhortations, arguments, conversions, speeches, reports, remarks, words. On the contrary, they worked. They worked with their hands.

As a journalist, therefore, and vicariously on behalf of Cabinet members, United States Senators, clergymen and lawyers, I listened to my new friends with appropriate and profound humility. Each of them spent his working hours in strained postures in some four-foot or three-foot low deep dark wet gut of the earth, pursuing coal with a pick or a cutting-machine or a shovel or some other instrument on which he used his hands, and crouching with his neck also and his shoulders, and crawling with the help of his feet, too, and shivering or sweating with his whole body. These men were predestined conservatives. Wisdom would flow from them.

But I soon learned a few things that made me change my mind. At least they made me change part of it. These men could not safely be regarded as both conservative and wise.

For consider the consequences of regarding them as conservative.

The national leaders of the United Mine Workers do not get their offices by inheritance or by massacre. They are elected, and they are elected by universal direct vote of all the God-fearing workingmen in all the local unions of miners in the United States. Further:

The last convention of the United Mine Workers was notoriously more radical than the national leaders; and I now learned that one is obliged by the facts to regard the national convention as being also more immediately representative than the national leaders. The facts are:

When a miner votes for national leaders, he sits in his home town and votes for names on a list of famous names. By the fame of those names in the United Mine Workers he knows the policies which those names indicate and promise. But naturally he can seldom know the personalities behind those names. And sometimes—just exactly as when he is voting for United States Senator—he may be tempted by the fame of a name to the neglect of policies.

On the other hand, in the case of delegates to the national convention, the miner is fully informed personally. The delegates to the national convention are elected by all the honest God-fearing workingmen in all the local unions of miners in the United States, voting union by union for delegates immediately out of the membership of each union. When a miner votes for a delegate to the national convention, he knows the man.

Knowing the man, he sent him to the last convention; and when all the men so sent were in their seats in Cleveland, they ordered the national leader not only to call the strike as called but to proceed vigorously also to destroy the institution of private property in mines and to nationalize the mining industry—nationalize it with democratic management added—nationalize it with participation in management by miners—miners—ordinary common honest God-fearing miners.

Thus we arrive at a terrific problem in the American electorate. If the miners in mines are sound, sensible conservative fellows, content with existing institutions, which exist and are American, then clearly we see before us some four hundred thousand male inhabitants of the United States who should instantly be disfranchised by some bill which Mr. Palmer can easily draw. They are manifestly incapable of casting a ballot. Conservative, patriotic, reverencing private property, they go straightway to their union halls and equip themselves with a whole full complement of rulers at Indianapolis and at Cleveland wild, wicked, and radical.

I decided to give up the theory that the miners are conservative. It leads to heresy. Industrial voting is easier than political voting. A miner knows the issues in the mining industry better than

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he knows the issues in the League of Nations. If he cannot vote expressively in the industry, he cannot vote expressively in the commonwealth. Voting is vain. Which is heresy. Americans who have endowed jobs or dollar-a-year jobs as high priests of Americanism can indulge in heresy. I am orthodox.

I decided to cling only to the theory that miners are wise. They worked with their hands and feet, and could instruct me. They could. They did.

Their delegates having voted for nationalization, I asked them what they thought about it.

They answered. They did not once mention Karl Marx. They did not once mention Nikolai Lenin. They did not once mention any Socialist, Bolshevik, Syndicalist, or Anarchist, or any piece of paper by any of them, or any piece of paper by anybody. So far as they are concerned, the Attorney General seems perfectly welcome to capture all the pieces of paper in the world and read them.

These miners mentioned respectable things. They mentioned coal operators. They mentioned coal. They mentioned seams of coal. They mentioned the distribution of work between seams and between districts and between seasons and between mines and between men. They mentioned coal operators some more. They mentioned coal operators at length, and ceased. They seemed to think that they had answered my question.

They had. They had said really nothing about nationalization and they had made me understand perfectly why their delegates had voted for nationalization.

Now in Washington I have to think of them as very distant. The earth has closed over them. The dispute in the air before the Coal Wages Board at Washington seems to be scheduled to be a dispute only about hours and wages. The policy of the national leaders of the United Mine Workers seems to be a policy confining itself for the present almost exclusively to hours and wages. And I admit I do not care to offer wisdom to those national leaders.

When I see how Mr. Lewis has backed Mr. Garfield across the ropes in one corner and Judge Anderson in another and the Cabinet in a third and the coal operators in the fourth and has got them all wondering what they see and if they see it, I just about think that he ought to have been our representative at Paris. He would have made a great point of conceding Gibraltar to Lloyd George and would have looked gravely grieved till he was offered something in return. I do not care to tell him what to say to the Coal Wages Board. But those miners in the mines were talking about things which no settlement of hours and wages can ever settle.

I sometimes imagine one of them coming up out of the earth to stand before the Coal Wages Board and say his little say. I think he would say it, in executive session, all sitting and all comfortable and friendly, more or less to the purport following:

. . . . . .

All right. We're sore. Let it go at that. We admit it. We're certainly tired of the way you operators don't run mines.

You think I'm going to talk about short work. That's only the beginning. And I'd just like to remind you how you call *your* strikes.

You don't give any notices. You don't call for any conferences. You simply close your mines right down.

Then you say you haven't any orders. In my mine you didn't have any orders for more than nine or ten days out of eight weeks running last year. No orders. No market.

Well? Whose business is it to get the orders? Do you expect me to fix the market? You own the mines. You're supposed to be running them.

If I ever have an idea in the mine, the foreman says: "Jimmie, I'm hired to have the brains. You've got the chance to do what I say."

When we had those committees during the war, there was two of us fellows off one day. Too much booze. Yes, that's true, Mr. Smith, thank you for reminding me: I did once see one of you coal operators take a drink. Well, the mine-boss says: "We'll just mark those two fellows down on the paper for decreasing production by being off drunk." "All right," says our fellows, "and we'll just mark down the seven fellows that's been off for three days because you've got gas in their part of the mine." "You will?" says the boss. "You will not. Do you want to get me in wrong with the mine inspector? You will not." I ask you: is a fellow going to offer suggestions that ain't wanted to a fellow that can fire him?

Most of the suggestions that would improve your mines and the mining business might be good for us and good for the public but they might be rotten for you and you won't ever want them.

Because look:

When you strike against us and close your mines down and leave us without any work except for a couple of days in a week or a few days in a month for months, like you did last year, what happens?

Do you take the work there is and the orders you can get and share it up fair between yourselves and between us? You know damn well you don't.

Right in the same seam where I work there's another mine that was working almost steady when there was no work for me. That mine's got a

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salesman. He's a smooth talker . The coal's the same. It's the same lay of coal. But because he's a good salesman he gets all the orders and I get no work at all and my wife and children's up against it. We don't call that sense.

But anyway I go and work in some mine perhaps that's got some orders, after a while. And a lot of other fellows has gone there too. And you take us all on; because you want to make a good showing for arguing to get coal-cars from the railroad. And then you haven't enough cars in the mine for all of us. And we hang around for a couple of hours at a time, waiting for those cars and earning nothing, right along. You can't keep the work smooth and even and fair between us from one district to another or from one time of the year to another or from one mine to another or even in the same mine. You're always making us lie around and lay off.

And then you have the nerve to get sore about it. You get sore because we get the habit. We lay off any time. That's what you say. Now let me get sore some.

Do you know that next Thursday your job's yours? You do. It's right there waiting for you, and you're expected. But what do I know about next Thursday? What do I know about next Tuesday or Saturday or any other day?

A fellow says to me "Let's go hunting next Saturday." And perhaps I say "Well, it's a chance I lose a day's work. But it's just as good a chance there won't be no work that day. I'll take a chance." Perhaps.

And on Thursday perhaps it's cold. You fellows don't understand. You've got the habit of going to work. I ain't got no habit of going to work Thursday mornings. Where would I get it from? And let me tell you. When you lie in bed and think of a mine you don't just naturally leap out and yell "Lead me to it." You need to be pushed.

That's where the habit comes in. I've talked with other fellows. Some of them has worked in other places, like cotton mills. It's one thing when every time the wife shakes you in the morning it means beat it to work where the work is. It's another thing when it means the work is there or it isn't. Perhaps. You get restless, perhaps. It's perhaps all the time in this mining, and you fellows get it the same way we do.

Why right now I'll say some of you operators right here is filling contracts and no profit. You say you do. We know you do. But why do you?

You'll say you wanted coal cars from the railroad, and the railroad was willing to buy some coal from you cheap, and you thought perhaps you might get some other contracts, and then you thought perhaps you wouldn't be able to get them, and you got a pain in your head guessing, and here was the railroad offering to buy, and you thought perhaps if you let the railroad have that coal, why, the railroad would kindly switch you some cars to fill your other contracts, if you get them perhaps, and so you let the railroad have that low contract, and it was worse than you thought, and now you're losing money perhaps.

Say! You fellows claim to be bosses of the business. You claim to be bosses of one of the great big businesses of the country, and you can't make your customers come across and hand in their orders regular so you can work your mines regular and you can't keep the railroads from soaking you all the time. You can't play even between us miners and you can't play even between the railroads and your other customers. You get part of the miners working and part not working, part of the business fat and part in the hole, part of the customers paying too little and part paying too much. We never know where we are, and the best you can say for yourselves is that you never know where you are.

We've begun to think this out. What is this nationalization? I don't know much about it but I calculate it means if you fellows don't start something pretty quick we will. We don't object to bosses. Say! We'd like to have some. And they've got to be some fellows who can keep the whole thing going all together right and fair for everybody.

We come along to you and say the cost of living's gone up and ask for a raise. You say "This mine's broke." We say "Is that mine over there broke?" You say "Oh, no. But that's a low-cost mine. They can dig coal there cheap. In this mine it costs a lot to dig coal. It's a high-cost mine." That lets you out. That's what you think.

We think: "Great system! No end of coal in low-cost mines, and all sorts of coal being dug in high-cost mines! Why not take it out of the low-cost mines? Why all these high-cost mines?" Anyway, we go to the low-cost fellow.

We say to him: "Got to have a raise." "Oh, no," says he. "I'll tell you how we do it. It may be I'm making money. But look at that other fellow in that high-cost mine. He's losing money. Now what we do is this: we average up what I'm making and what he's losing, and that's the average of the industry, and it's pretty close to nothing, and you don't get a raise."

Then we say: "This is all bunk. Stop taking coal out where it ain't profitable. Stop doing all these things that ain't profitable. Get together and produce so much coal and produce it where it's

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cheapest and make people take it regular when it's produced and at regular prices for everybody. Get together. Make it one real business."

And you say: "Get together? We want to get together. But the Government won't let us. You're right. We ought to. But the public won't let us."

Well, that's not our fault. We ain't running the coal business. You're the bosses. You admit the business is wrong now. We've heard you telling Congress how wrong it is. And you admit the only way to cure it is to get together. Somebody's got to get it together. You say the public won't let you do it your way. Well. What next? Where do we go from here? Can you think of anything?

I'll tell you what I think. We've declared for nationalization. The public won't stand for private trusts. Nationalization—the way I look at it—is get together and a public trust. You know you've got to have the get together. The coal business can't go on being crazy. We won't stand for it. You've got to have the get together. Well, go ahead and dope out some new way of making it public that takes you in, if you can. I'll say you've got to do just one thing in it for me. You've got to fix it so I don't get stung all the time by something I've got nothing to do with.

Look how it is now. Somebody makes a good sale, for somebody else, and I'm out of work. Somebody gets to know somebody and switches a contract, and I'm out of work. Somebody holds off buying coal till he can get it cheaper than it costs, and I'm out of work. Somebody decides to go and buy coal three hundred miles away because he's got a chance to buy into the mine and make the railroads carry the coal across a few more states, and I'm out of work. Somebody, and a lot of 'em, just about the time the cost of living's going up, goes and bids too low on a lot of contracts, and I can't get a raise.

I'm tired of being kicked around by somebody I can't see and ain't got no right to mention it to. I'm tired of being the goat in a game I ain't playing.

I guess that's all. I like to figure these things out. I've thought about them. I guess that's all.

. . . . . .

I think that would be about all.

It will still be there when wages are raised by no matter what per cent and when hours are shortened to no matter what shortness. It will still be there. What is it? It is the bituminous coal industry of America conducted as a sport for owners.

Out of the mouths of miners comes the radical cry that somehow—somehow—it has to be conducted as a science.

WILLIAM HARD.

In His Baby Blue Ship

THERE are some people who can't enjoy fairy-stories, and don't like imagining. They are a bit too hard-headed. I don't blame such people: they are all right enough in their way. Only they ought not to go around saying fairy-stories are silly. They ought simply to let them alone and live nice hard-headed lives.

It is the same way with soft-headed people who cannot enjoy the real world. Not having much taste for it, and not getting on too well in it, they are apt to call it pretty bad names, and to wish it were different. I think them too hasty. Before they abuse or advise it they should first understand it. If they can't, they should let it alone more, and live in their dreams.

Or in those of such dreamers as Maeterlinck, Dunsany, or Poe.

The Maeterlinck books constitute quite a beautiful country. They have long been a favorite home for our soft-headed friends. And those of us who are of a compound between hard and soft enjoy visiting the Maeterlinck coast as we might a resort. It is pleasantly unreal; it is varied. Gentle breezes of sweetness; blue seas, massive rocks; and storms too. Here and there a crag, or dark castle, of terrible grandeur. Is it not picturesque? Don't poke at the castles with your umbrella; you might go through the tin; but take it all in the right spirit as you would Coney Island. Human nature being what it is, there is certainly a need for this place.

There is one little difficulty about the situation however. Monsieur Maeterlinck, the proprietor, although he makes his home in this region, likes sometimes to visit the real world, if but for a change. Well, this would be nothing to object to, though for him injudicious, but he is such a stranger there that he does not at all know his place. He takes himself seriously at his home: it is natural, I'm sure: but it leads him to speak in the real world with a voice of authority. He is not in the least offensive about it, no one could be more gentle, but he doesn't at all realize that his rank here permits no such tone. On the Materlinck coast, in the realms of romance, he is king. In the real world such writers must sit with the mental defectives.

It would give me more pleasure (or at any rate it ought to, I know) to dwell on his many abilities than on this one fault. But this excellent man has the misfortune to resemble wood-alcohol. Wood-alcohol is a respectable liquid: it is useful in varnish: when poured in a lamp it heats tea: yes, it has its good side. Yet how little we dwell on its uses, how much on its defect: its one small defect that it's fatal when taken internally.

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Maeterlinck has for years made a business of beautiful thoughts. With some of them he built romantic tales that are or were a refreshment. But others he embodied in sermons addressed to reality. He told us none needed to go to his coast for romance, or for purity and beauty and goodness, for we really were full of them. We were made in fact of just those ingredients, at least in our hearts; and it followed, he said, that our actions should be chosen accordingly. Without ever having learned anything much of mankind, he described just the way that he felt all mankind should behave. He put on the robes of a sage, and he sweetened his looks, and his voice became tender and thrilling and rather impressive; and he wrote about the Treasure of the Humble, and Wisdom and Destiny.

The real world is not easy to live in. It is rough: it is slippery. Without the most clear-eyed adjustments we fall and get crushed. A man must stay sober: not always, but most of the time. Those of us who drink from the flasks of the sages of dreamland become so intoxicated with guff we are a peril to everyone.

We trust in Hague tribunals for instance, on the eve of great wars.

The flask that Wood-alcohol Maurice, if I may so call him, held so long to our lips in the years before 1914, produced the usual effects of joy first, and then blindness and coma. I speak from experience. I took some myself and was poisoned, and I knew other cases. But it poisoned poor Maeterlinck more—I may say, most of all—for he had taken his own medicine honorably as fast as he mixed it. Owing to this imprudence, he found himself, in 1914, in such a deep coma it almost killed him to come suddenly out of it. His anger at having to wake up and face things was loud. He found himself compelled for a while to live in the midst of hard facts, and his comments upon them were scathing; as all dreamers' are.

Since then he has gone part-way back to the land of romance, and if he will stay there I shall not prefer charges against him. He is one of the masters of fancy. He can mine fairy gold. But any time he comes to this world we're now learning to live in, or offers us any more mail-order lessons in sweetness, I think we should urge him to go and stay where he belongs.

There is a poem by Joaquin Miller about Columbus that describes his long voyage. It consists, as I remember, entirely of groans by the sailors, who keep asking Columbus whether he will please let them turn back. But Columbus never has but one answer, and that is "Sail on." He says "Sail on, sail on," over and over, at the end of each stanza. I grant you it must have been monotonous enough to the crew, who after the first week or two probably knew it by heart; but never mind, it sounds well to us. It's especially good when declaimed. I don't suppose Columbus himself climbed the poop and declaimed it: he merely stopped shaving, stuck his head out of the chart-room, and screeched it,—suitably mixed with whatever profanities his day could command. But Time, that softens all homely history, has beautified this. All the boy Columbuses I ever heard recite it, when I was at school, had as noble a way as one could ask of telling their crews to sail on.

I did not mean to make so long a digression. To get back to Maeterlinck. We ought to provide him with a beautiful baby-blue ship. Odd, charming allegorical figures should sit on the decks, and fenders should hang from the sides to ward off bumps of truth. Astern he might tow a small wife-boat, as a mariner should, with its passenger capacity carefully stamped on the bottom. And instead of Columbus, a honey-fed spirit of dream should stand in his prow and adjure him to sail on, to dreamland. "Dream on, dream on, dream on," she should patter, each time he grew restless. I could not take a turn in his prow myself, it would be too much honor; but I should be glad to take my stand in the gentleman's rear, and do all I could to accelerate his progress from thence.

CLARENCE DAY, JR.

Pittsburgh

Coming upon it unawares,
A town of men and millionaires,
A town of coal-dust and of churches,
I thought of moons, I thought of birches,
Goals forgotten in the faces
Of the swift who run the races,
Whip-poor-wills and misty meadows,
Musk-rats in the river-shadows,
Robins whistling five o'clock,
Mornings naked on a rock.

WITTER BYNNER.

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Books and Things

SAY whatever you please, after reading Prejudices, First Series (Knopf), about its author, Mr. H. L. Mencken, and almost immediately you wish to retract and explain. From I, Mary MacLane, Mr. Mencken learns "that a Scotch Presbyterian with a soaring soul is as cruelly beset as a wolf with fleas, a zebra with the botts." Unbelievable, isn't it, that a clever man should exhibit himself in the act of trying so hard to be smart? If one knew nothing of Mr. Mencken but this fragment one would set him down as a particularly unhappy victim of the will-to-power-and-punch, and think no more about him. And one would be quite wrong. Mr. Mencken can also be witty without seeming to try. He can say, when writing about books on sex hygiene: "The mystery of sex presents itself to the young, not as a scientific problem to be solved, but as a romantic emotion to be accounted for. The only result of the current endeavor to explain its phenomena by seeking parallels in botany is to make botany obscene."

Put cotton in your ears and listen to the noise of Mr. Mencken's vocabulary: Slobber, hocus-pocus, softies, popinjays, flapdoodle, flubdub, poppycock, balderdash, pish-posh, clapper-clawing, rumble-bumble, sissified. I cannot think of his vocabulary without wondering whether he is a shrew. "A Birmingham anthropologist, Dr. Jordan," says William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience, "has divided the human race into two types, whom he calls 'shrews' and 'non-shrews' respectively. The shrew-type is defined as possessing an 'active unimpassioned temperament.' In other words, shrews are the 'motors' rather than the 'sensories,' and their expressions are as a rule more energetic than the feelings which appear to prompt them." Yet Mr. Mencken is not one of Dr. Jordan's shrews. He only looks like one. In spite of his vocabulary, so appropriate to nobody but a man trying to hide his lack of energy behind it, his feelings really are energetic. No one can doubt his energy who reads his Prejudices through, though many single sentences sound as if he were faking it.

Equally irrelevant to Mr. Mencken's real gifts is his desire to épater le bourgeois. I use the shop-worn phrase because the desire is just as shop-worn. Long ago there was a split in the bourgeois party. Every writer of Mr. Mencken's rank except Mr. Mencken knows that some of them, at that remote date, enrolled themselves in les bourgeois inépatables, and that the left-behind others are not worth shocking, being such easy marks. But Mr. Mencken cannot let the poor bourgeois alone. He has a point, and a good point, to make against Mr. Veblen's belief that we hire men to cut our lawns, instead of putting cows there to crop them, because "to the average popular apprehension," Mr. Veblen says, "a herd of cattle so pointedly suggests thrift and usefulness that their presence . . . . would be intolerably cheap." And here is part of Mr. Mencken's comment: "Has the genial professor, pondering his great problems, ever taken a walk in the country? And has he, in the course of that walk, ever crossed a pasture inhabited by a cow (*Bos taurus*)? And has he, making that crossing, ever passed astern of the cow herself? And has he, thus passing astern, ever stepped carelessly, and—But this is not a medical work, so I had better haul up." Such a putting of his finger to his nose, such a winking and grimacing, read suspiciously like flourishes to something Mr. Mencken regards as brightly daring. Now I deny that it is daring to object to cow-dung on lawns. Was Mr. Mencken afraid nobody would be offended if he made his objection simply?

When I began this article my plan was to write each paragraph so that the end would contradict the beginning, but I can think of no passage in Prejudices which effaces the impression left by what I have just quoted. Let me add, however, that the quotation is in a class by itself, that to be "daring" is not one of Mr. Mencken's besetting faults, that for every once he tries to shock les bourgeois he scolds them and flouts them twenty times. His dislike of the crowd has the same origin as his dislike of the men he calls the professors, namely, in a generous anger. He is angry or contemptuous or exasperated whenever he sees good books ignored and feeble books exalted. In other words, he is often angry. When "the professors" unite in praising an author he esteems, for example Poe, Mr. Mencken is uneasy, and his uneasiness takes him back to the time when "the professors" gave Poe the cold shoulder. "If it ever occurred," he says, "to any American critic of position, during Poe's lifetime, that he was a greater man than either Cooper or Irving, then I have been unable to find any trace of the fact in the critical literature of the time." Let us be glad, on Mr. Mencken's account, that his search was unsuccessful, for success would have made him rather unhappy. And here, I think, we have one of the contradictions he interests us by revealing. In the spring which feeds Mr. Mencken's critical activities, most of the boiling and bubbling is done by a love for the books he thinks good, a hatred of the books he thinks bad. His business as a critic is to communicate this hatred and this love, and if he were successful on a large scale, if he found either the professors or the highbrows or the crowd in agreement with him often, then he wouldn't much like his company. The strongest critic, he appears to believe, is the critic who stands most alone.

For practical purposes the best critic is he who does most to increase a reader's enjoyment, either by giving him new books to enjoy or by intensifying and differentiating his enjoyment of old ones. This a critic cannot do for you unless he has the art of inclining you to agree with him. For me, Mr. Mencken is not that kind of critic. He seldom persuades me to feel I shall like a book by saying that he likes it. Of The Purpose, a Sudermann story in the volume called in English, the Indian Lily, Mr. Mencken says: "Here, in less than fifteen thousand words, Sudermann rehearses the tragedy of a whole life, and so great is the art of the thing that one gets a sense of perfect completeness, almost of exhaustiveness." To my taste The Purpose is a workmanlike story, without any of Sudermann's worst faults. Another Story in the same book, Autumn, is "almost a fit complement to Joseph Conrad's great paean to youth triumphant." Never, I say upon reading that incredible comparison, never will I take Mr. Mencken's word for anything remotely related to life or letters. Then I turn the page, and I'm not so sure, for I come upon Mr. Mencken's admirable characterization of George Ade, which is both generous and wise, and at once I want to read George Ade over again.

But the book I most wanted to read, just after finishing Prejudices, First Series, was Prejudices, Second Series, by the same author. The second series will be as readable and sincere as the first. It will have the same defects. Mr. Mencken will put into it extraordinarily able things, like his articles on Mr. Wells, Mr Bennett and Mr. Nathan, and he will put in howlers. He doesn't know the difference. He will never know.

P. L.

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Ludendorff Self-Exposed

My Thoughts and Actions, by General Erich Ludendorff. New York: Harper & Bros.

ON demand from Prince Max's cabinet the Emperor dismissed Ludendorff on October 26th. "On October 27th I stood in Spa, in the prime of my life, at the end of a military career which had brought me infinite work to do, and at the same time a responsibility such as falls to the lot of few men. In the evening I left Spa. In Aachen I sought out my first war billet. I thought of Liege. There I had found my manhood, and had not altered since. My muscles stiffened. I went back home." And from home he went to Sweden and wrote the account of himself which he would like posterity to accept.

He sees himself as a sort of Gulliver bound down by the politicians at home, and finally ruined by them. He was never wrong. His judgment was always correct. He alone really understood the war, and while the victories are to his credit, the defeats are due to others. It is an unmanly performance, and though it contains incidental information that is of some value, it is a dull and uncandid book.

Perhaps it is better thus. The Ludendorff legend will not be nourished by these memoirs. They are not the record of a tragic ruin; they excite no pity and no awe, and they leave behind them the tedium of voluble self-justification, and an immeasurable complacency, and a lingering sense of stupidity. The soldierly competence of Ludendorff was high. Yet as the brain of the General Staff of a country in which the General Staff occupies the position it did in Germany, his failure is written all over these pages. Orderly and logical in his thought, capable of controlling mentally a vast number of factors at once, his judgment failed at the decisive moments, and he led his people to a disaster so complete as to stifle his mind. At the end the great technician is reduced to an uncomprehending and exclaiming moralist.

These memoirs show that his critical failure occurred in the winter months just before America entered the war. They were the months of transition in which the whole character of the war was altered. Up to the conquest of Rumania the war on both sides was running on its original momentum. The German army was still a great organization with a morale for the offensive, but it had reached the limits of profitable aggression both east and west and in the Balkans. It had done everything it could do, but it had not won the war. With the Allies the orthodox European phase had also reached its climax. Italy and Rumania had been secured, Russia was still a belligerent, but there was no decision. The war would not be decided by pitched battle as things then stood; neither G.H.Q. controlled the war. In a profound sense the European war had come to an indecisive end. It was merging into the infinitely complex struggle marked by the participation of America and the disintegration of all ancient authority in eastern Europe.

Ludendorff foresaw none of this, nor does he to this day understand how radically the character of the war was transformed in the winter of 1916-17. Though from page 361 on his bewilderment is ever greater, though his grip is obviously relaxing, the reason for it he does not grasp. He simply scolds the shirkers at home more savagely, and asserts his own patriotism more loudly. He knew at the end of 1916 that it was necessary to take stock, and of course he was keenly aware of the superiority of the Entente in reserves and material. He drew up the so-called Hindenburg program and proposed a draconian work or fight law. Except in the gamble of March, 1918, his military judgment as to material equipment needed seems to have been extraordinary. But when the period of deadlock and ferment set in at the end of 1916 his admirable technical judgments rested on perfectly unreal notions of what human beings were capable of doing. He expected a military discipline and a sacrificial ardor among civilians that only the most highly trained troops possessed.

Though no man could be more emphatic about the superiority of the drilled German over the undrilled Russian, he somehow cannot contrive to remember that the undrilled civilian is simply incapable of doing as a civilian what he can do as a soldier. Many militarists make this curious error. They will tell you, as Ludendorff does, that only military discipline can create the proper spirit; then they go into tantrums of rage, as Ludendorff does, because people not under military discipline do not possess the martial virtues. For all his parade of toughmindedness, Ludendorff lived for over two years on the delusion that by sheer act of will the whole German people would transform itself into battalions with the morale of shock troops.

This deep miscalculation prevented him from adjusting his mind to the facts. He knew that victory was impossible even at that date, yet he insisted on a political policy based on a victory. The terms of peace which he laid down about Christmas, 1916, were a program of victory. They were the terms of the Pan-Germans, not the extremest fantastic terms of a dictated German peace, but a peace of annexations nevertheless. His mind was torn by an unanalyzed dilemma. He saw that he could not win, but he insisted on acting as if he were going to win, and he justified himself by the conviction that the Allies would not make a moderate peace. In all of this he did not realize, though he was the conqueror of Russia, that a Russian Revolution was preparing. He did not know that Germany's prospects were really more favorable at the moment than they seemed.

It was at this juncture that he rather ignorantly and at haphazard accepted the Admiralty opinion on the submarine war. It was not a matter within the field of his own competence. But it appealed to him. It was one of those downright and terrific acts which are an enormous relief to a man of his temperament. It was concrete and mechanical and violent whereas Bethmann was all fuss and nerves over imponderables that somehow symbolized to him the lowered morale at home. The emotion of doing something desperate and big counted more than any sober calculation of results. He had not considered, for example, such possibilities of successful defense against the submarine as increased ship-building. It is fairly evident that as much as any man in Germany he was the victim of Admiralty propaganda. He was predisposed to accept the conclusion.

This new war which opened in 1917 turned chiefly on American participation, the Russian revolution, the break up of Austria-Hungary, and the disintegration of German morale. Ludendorff could not comprehend this war which he was supposed to be directing. About America he deliberately says little, for his misjudgment there he knows to be a reflection on his military prescience. It is an unpleasant subject and he avoids it. The Russian revolution

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he saw alternately as a Godsend and a curse, chiefly curse. Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk seemed to him a man conducting pro-Entente propaganda, and his feeling about peace traps would have qualified him for editorial writing on many of our newspapers. His wisdom on the nationalities question of Austria is confined to regret that the Emperor Charles pardoned some of the Czechs, and his feeling about Entente propaganda is frankly the tribute of the aspiring apprentice to the seasoned master. Pages and pages he devotes to the contrast between Allied efficiency and German lethargy in propaganda. In fact he ascribes the German defeat directly to propaganda which prevented Germany from rising to a sufficient height of loyalty and devotion.

During the war the whole Allied world was more or less under the spell of that great machine which was supposed to go ruthlessly but surely to its object. This book breaks that spell. It is the record of a commonplace, self-deluding mind utterly bewildered by events which its garrison education had not prepared it to understand. Ludendorff was not a great dictator; he was a technical militarist meddling in everything just enough to make any thoroughgoing and realistic decision impossible. Because of his haphazard relationship to the civilian authorities Germany in the end could neither make peace nor wage war. His only logic was that of military necessity, and when the course of events would not support the logic, he became a perpetual obstruction to the only sort of policy which might have prevented the final disaster. Even when his judgment told him that Germany was beaten, he was asking for the virtual annexation of Belgium, and railing at those who were ready to renounce Belgium. Knowing one thing, he did another, because he did not have the final courage to face the facts. Germany was led to her doom, and the chaos of all Europe protracted, by a man who in his inner soul knew for the last two years of the war that he could not win. He would yield nothing and in the end he had to yield everything.

That is not quite accurate. The people to whom he lied are paying and with them the innocent of all lands who were compelled to resist him. He himself is a savagely bitter man, and a highly paid writer.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

Justice and the Poor

Justice and the Poor, by Reginald Heber Smith. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

WHEN a lawyer says that poor men and rich men are equal before the law, he means about as much as the diplomat means who says that small nations and great nations are equal before the law. He means that in a court of justice no special legal handicap is imposed on the poor, beyond the handicap of their poverty. He means that rich and poor have an even start in the race for justice, and run under the same rules, and that if the poor lag behind it is their poverty, and not the law, that is to blame.

In this book, published for the Carnegie Foundation, a higher and finer ideal of justice is held forth. The duty of the state, Mr. Smith conceives, goes further than to provide an arena for litigation, in which the prize of justice goes to the most successful and resourceful litigant. Poor and rich are not equal before the law, if there are costs and delays in securing justice which the rich can afford and the poor cannot. Justice is free and equal only when the law is as serviceable to the wage-earner in recovering a wage claim of ten dollars as it is to his employer in recovering a contract claim of ten thousand dollars. It is the duty of the state to bring justice to all its citizens, whether they can pay for it or not.

How far from this ideal of justice our traditional legal procedure has carried us, Mr. Smith portrays in convincing detail. A wage earner has earned ten dollars for a week's work, which an unscrupulous employer refuses to pay. He appeals to the state to help him recover his just claim. First he must find a lawyer and pay him a fee. Complicated legal papers must be drawn up, and expensive formal notice served on the defendant. Then he must pay various kinds of charges, depending upon the particular jurisdiction, the cost of writs, entry fees, calendar fees, witness fees, and what not. Then he must wait. Perhaps the case will come to trial soon, perhaps not for weeks. Perhaps a single trial will settle the matter, but perhaps also the defendant will claim a new trial before a higher court, with new expenses and lawyers' fees. After several months, perhaps a year, after spending valuable days in court, after paying in fees and expenses several times the amount of the claim, the wage earner may get a final judgment.

However perfect the theoretical equality of the wage earner and his employer before the law, it is obvious that the procedural obstacles and costs in the enforcement of small claims make the expense of obtaining justice prohibitive to the wage earner. Mr. Smith dwells forcefully on the social effects of such a denial of justice. Statistical studies show that there are about thirty-five million men, women and children in the United States whose income is so small that they could not afford to pay any substantial lawyers' fees or court expenses. For them, equality before the law is a mockery.

The largest part of Mr. Smith's book is devoted to a study of the agencies now at work to remedy this challenging defect in our judicial procedure. The traditional right of the poor to sue in forma pauperis, and to be assigned counsel free of charge, has proved of slight value, and has in many jurisdictions fallen into complete disuse. But during the past decade remarkable progress has been made in other directions.

Perhaps the most significant step has been the establishment of "small claims" courts, in a number of western and middle western states. A small claims court dispenses with all the expensive and cumbersome machinery of the ordinary courts of law. There are no lawyers, no pleadings, no formal trials. There is a startling sanity about their procedure. The claimant walks into the judge's room, and tells his story, as he would to his own lawyer. Instead of sending a high salaried court official to serve a formal process, the judge calls up the defendant on the telephone, or sends him a letter by mail, and an appointment is made to discuss the case. Perhaps the claim involves a broken mirror, or a damaged mattress; instead of hearing expert witnesses at so much per hour, as to the value of the mirror or mattress, the judge calls up a department store on the telephone, and satisfies himself what the value is. In many cases he is able to effect a friendly agreement, without a formal court order. With an expense to the claimant of not more than fifty cents, and in a few minutes' time, the case is disposed of. Mr. Smith's careful study of the records of all the small claims courts

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leads to the conclusion that in practice the courts have been an unqualified success.

The "public defender" movement, now spreading rapidly in the United States, also has Mr. Smith's unhesitating endorsement. The state spends many thousands of dollars in gathering and presenting in the criminal courts evidence to send a man to prison. If he is impecunious, he must go undefended, or rely on the uncertain and unsatisfactory help of voluntary or assigned counsel. The most elementary principles of justice require the state to be at least as diligent in keeping an innocent man out of jail, as in putting a guilty man in jail. A public office, maintained at public expense, at which persons charged with crime who cannot afford to employ their own counsel can obtain legal assistance, is an indispensable part of any humane and just legal system. Yet with a few honorable exceptions the American bar has fought the "public defender" movement, with all the weight of its powerful organization.

Other remedial agencies, such as arbitration and conciliation courts, domestic relations courts, and administrative tribunals such as workmen's compensation boards and industrial commissions, receive careful treatment. The rest of the book is taken up with a painstaking and comprehensive survey of the private and public legal aid organizations throughout the United States, and a convincing argument for their expansion and development.

Mr. Smith's book is remarkable, both for the extraordinary practical value of the material which he has collected, and for the impartial and liberal spirit in which the material is treated. Prepared for the Carnegie Foundation, in order to guide the trustees of the foundation in determining whether they should grant the application of certain legal aid societies for grants of funds, and written by a lawyer who has in the past been closely affiliated with private legal aid work, one might perhaps expect that the book would show that spirit of hostility toward governmental activity which so often characterizes the point of view of the charity worker. On the contrary, Mr. Smith gives to the governmental agencies, such as the small claims court, the public defender and the state or municipal legal aid office, the highest and most convincing praise, and he concludes with the prophecy that the work of the private legal aid organizations, being essentially a part of the machinery of justice, will also in the long run pass under public control.

G. C. H.

Russia Half Seen

Russia's Ruin, by E. H. Wilcox. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Trailing The Bolsheviki In Siberia, by Carl W. Ackerman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

THESE two books present an interesting contrast between British and American methods of journalism. Mr. Wilcox describes the course of events in Russia from the outbreak of the war to the Bolshevik coup with the plodding, conscientious accuracy of an experienced English foreign correspondent. Mr. Ackerman sets down his impressions of Siberia during the past winter with the brilliant superficiality of an American star reporter.

Mr. Wilcox interprets the Russian Revolution in a very conservative spirit. He feels that the proper leaders of the new Russian democracy were the politicians of the reactionary Fourth Duma, Milyukov, Gutchkov, Rodzianko. He even praises such leading figures in the Tsarist regime as Stolypin and Sazonoff. His acid test of the governments set up after the March Revolution is not whether they represent the Russian people, but whether they would help the Allies win the war. Speaking of the Bolsheviki he says:

"It would not be difficult to convict them, under ordinary human law, of every kind of murder, atrocity, robbery, fraud and forgery. In duplicity and mendacity they have probably surpassed all political parties in history."

In the light of this attitude the author's condemnation of the Sisson documents as a collection of clumsy forgeries is particularly interesting. After declaring that the only fact proved by the documents is "the incapacity of those who collected them for the mission with which they were entrusted," he gives the following proof of the suspicious character of Mr. Creel's "discovery":

"The pamphlet includes some fifteen or sixteen facsimiles by way of corroboration. One of these facsimiles purports to be a circular sent out on November 28, 1914, by the 'General Staff' of the German High Sea Fleet. Now such a body as a 'General Staff' does not exist in the German Navy. What corresponds in the Navy to the General Staff of the Army is the 'Admiral Staff.' The circular itself consists of eighteen lines. In these eighteen lines are two mistakes in grammar, seven mistakes in spelling and seven mistakes in phrasing."

Quoting from a statement put forth by a group of anti-Bolshevik Russians in London, the author then continues:

" 'The documents in question say nothing, because they produce an uneasy impression of forgery. The most important of them appear too 'proving,' too 'convincing' to be authentic. They leave a comic impression that the German General Staff was very anxious to divulge, in every trivial order, the most important state secrets. On the other hand, all these people, Lenin, Trotsky, Tchicherin and the others, are too anxious to supply us in every document with an ineffaceable trace of their treachery in the form of annotations, signatures, and so on."

In the early chapters of the book Mr. Wilcox gives an impressive picture of the utter rottenness of the old Tsarist regime. The blackmailer Manouiloff, the corrupt and inefficient Soukhomlinoff, the sinister reactionary Protopopoff, the filthy, debauched Rasputin, stand out as typical figures in a coterie of court figures whose baseness and degradation recall the most decadent days of the Roman and Byzantine Empires.

The author also reveals the dark workings of the Okhrana, the most gigantic and efficient spy system in the history of the world. In this connection he attempts to prove that the whole Bolshevik party, before the Revolution, was involved in dubious relations with the secret police. Here Mr. Wilcox seems to adopt too unreservedly the viewpoint of the non-Bolshevik revolutionary factions. It is true that Roman Malinovsky, a Bolshevik leader in the Fourth Duma, was finally exposed as an agent of the Okhrana. But Azev, most notorious of agents provocateurs, was a Social Revolutionist; and this party, on account of its terrorist tendencies, undoubtedly offered the chief temptation for the infiltration of police spies.

The author describes in detail the struggle between the soviets and the provisional government over the restatement of war aims which culminated in the retirement of

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Milyukov as Foreign Minister on account of his imperialistic views. Despite the author's unsympathetic interpretation it is impossible not to feel that this struggle was a memorable and inspiring example of genuine democratic spirit. The spectacle of a great people carefully discriminating between just and unjust war aims, refusing to make any compromise with diplomacy of the old order, candidly revealing their objects and ideals to allies and enemies alike, is altogether without a parallel in history. Under more favorable circumstances the "No annexations, no indemnities" formula put forward with such straightforward honesty by the Russian people might well have been the basis for a peace settlement very different from the imperialistic compact concluded at Versailles.

Mr. Wilcox is more indulgent than most commentators on the Russian situation in his estimate of Kerensky. He admits the fine idealism of the former Premier and praises him for his strenuous efforts to keep Russia in the war. He expresses regret, however, that Kerensky refused to cooperate with General Kornilov in the latter's attempt to "strengthen" the provisional government by substituting a dictatorship. Despite the distinctly conservative bias which he displays here and in many other instances, the author writes with such thoroughness and such evident honesty that his book may fairly be called the most informative account of the events between March and November, 1917, that has yet appeared in English.

Mr. Ackerman's narrative is colorful and interesting. He gives an excellent description of the external features of life in Siberia: the tiny trains crowded with refugees of all factions, the picturesque medley of races in Harbin and Vladivostok, the peasants in sheepskins coming to the stations to barter their produce for the scanty supplies of manufactured goods sent out from the towns. His story of the disappearance of the Tsar and the royal family from Ekaterinburg is an excellent piece of detective writing. And the book is full of amusing and pathetic anecdotes, illustrating the goodnatured shiftlessness and resigned fatalism of the Siberians after two years of political turmoil and economic distress. Moreover, it must be reckoned to Mr. Ackerman's credit that he does not attempt to demonstrate the supreme democracy of Supreme Ruler Kolchak, whom he frankly describes as dominated by reactionary influences.

On the other hand the author reveals serious limitations when he attempts to analyze the past history and present political conditions of Siberia and Russia. He unreservedly adopts the Czecho-Slovaks' own version of their breach with the soviets, German treachery and all, completely ignoring the rather important part which certain Allied officers played in stirring up this senseless conflict. Curiously enough, the book, despite its title, does not contain a single incident or conversation calculated to present the Bolshevik case from a sympathetic standpoint, and Mr. Ackerman nowhere reveals any adequate knowledge of the conditions which led up to and followed the Russian Revolution. He admits that intervention has been futile and harmful in many ways, but he seems vaguely apprehensive of the consequences of leaving the Siberians free to work out their own destinies without further foreign interference. But for this vagueness, this lack of grasp of fundamental facts and conditions, the book might have been a valuable contribution to the complex history of the Russian Revolution. As it stands it is simply a readable and interesting account of purely personal experiences and observations.

W. H. C.

The Taker, by Daniel Carson Goodman. New York: Boni and Liveright.

ASIDE from a more disciplined prose, The Taker is a retrogression from its author's previous novel, Hagar Revelly. Its undermining weakness is the inadequate presentation of the chief character, Leonard Vernon. The importance of a detailed and understanding delineation of Vernon cannot be over-estimated in a novel using the same block plot as Theodore Dreiser's The Genius and Willard Huntington Wright's The Man of Promise in which a man's life forms the core about which are spun his experiences with different women.

He starts well enough with a taut quarrel between Mrs. Vernon and her eighteen-year old Leonard. The boy in his rebellion appears cold, unsentimental, and determined. He wears a decidedly Nietzschean aspect which he further confirms by marrying solely for money and inheriting, when his father-in-law dies, the ownership of an art glass factory. With very little struggle he has gained a large business, wealth, and power. But unlike a true and insatiable striver for power he immediately settles down into a "buttery complacence." The Nietzschean mask is whisked away and the reader is led to construct another Vernon. This time the protagonist is dissatisfied with his marriage and from his artistic aptitude for sketching and his fondness for such authors as Pater, Rossetti, Verlaine, and Baudelaire, it seems as though we were going to witness another engaging Anatol at his amours. But this supposition is likewise dashed aside and we are given finally a prosaic man of business seeking little more than physical gratification in successive relations with rather stupid women. There is no reconciliation by the author of the youth who determined to be "hard and mean" and despised art with the man of cultivated tastes or with the limited fool at the end.

Whatever strength in character drawing Mr. Goodman has, comes out in girls like Marcy Moore and the younger Hagar Revelly—unquestioning little children of nature imprisoned in factory or department store, but stretching eager hands towards a more joyous life. Into the relationship between Vernon and Marcy the author has contrived to place something idyllic and there are pages when he writes of them with understanding, with candor, and with rhythm. But the rest is a solemn dullness as it must necessarily be with a man who marries first a mentally undeveloped woman and later a vice-crusading stenographer.

Mr. Goodman's intellectual powers are insufficient to elevate him above a poor relation of such American novelists as Theodore Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson, and Joseph Hergesheimer. He is kept down by an incapacity for patient analysis. Up to the present, his sole distinctions appear to be a certain brave and honest attitude toward life and the suppression visited upon Hagar Revelly by the Comstockians because of this attitude. And with the increasing tendency of American writers "to look at life coldly through brave eyes" his singularity has diminished considerably since his trouble six years ago. G. B. M.

Contributors

CAPTAIN SWINBURNE HALE is a graduate of Harvard College and Law School, who has practiced in New York City since 1908, except during the time of his service in the army.

CLARENCE DAY JR. is a frequent contributor to the New Republic and other magazines.

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